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If in William Blackstone's time we might have thought of a person's home
as their castle, in Mark Zuckerberg's time we might say that heir website is too.
Under cyber-trespass laws like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, courts have
treated online platforms as digital gatekeepers--as property owners that may
permit and restrict access to websites much like landowners may do with private
land in the real world. If platforms withhold their consent through words or
inference, cyber-trespass laws let them enforce their preferences about who may
access their services and gather information from the internet. Concerned about
reputations and profits, platforms have deployed their gatekeeper rights to scare
and sue those seeking to use their websites against their wishes. This legal
regime affects all sorts of actors-from academics to journalists to businesses to
consumers-who want to engage with the platforms' websites, even when they're
open to the public or when people permit complementary services to access their
accounts.
This Essay challenges the law's current embrace of gatekeeper ights.
Applying cyber-trespass law across the entire internet has empowered private
platforms to become public policymakers in unintended and unchecked ways. But
it's not too late to adopt a different legal regime-one that defers far less to
private companies to establish and enforce the internet's accessibility and
informational rules. This Essay offers a three-part legislative framework to
restrain the power of digital gatekeepers. To begin, Congress hould clarify that
cyber-trespass laws don't apply on websites that are accessible to the general
public. Congress should then mandate and shield certain forms of
interoperability between platforms. Finally, Congress hould pass targeted laws
to regulate the collection and use ofpublicly accessible information on websites.
Taking these steps will change the locus of governance in key internet policy
choices, stripping private platforms of the unbounded and trans-substantive
decisionmaking power they currently enjoy. Although this regulatory agenda is
ambitious, these are the kinds offundamental and structural changes needed to
protect privacy, speech, and consumer interests in the digital age.
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Don't let the fox guard the henhouse.
Don't assign a job to someone who will then
be in a position to exploit it for his own ends.1
Introduction
Everyone's agonizing over how to "fix" social media.2 After a steady
stream of scandals that shows no sign of abating, there's anger that online
Sacharoff, Alex Stamos, Nicolas Suzor, Christian Turner, Mariana Valente, and Rory Van Loo, and
for helpful discussions after presentations at the University of Georgia School of Law, Insper Sdo
Paulo, the University of Minnesota Law School, Stanford University, and Yale Law School.
1. GREGORY TITELMAN, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR PROVERBS AND SAYINGS
68 (1996).
2. See, e.g., MIKE GODWIN, THE SPLINTERS OF OUR DISCONTENT: HOW TO FIX SOCIAL MEDIA
AND DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BREAKING THEM 80 (Charles Duan ed., 2019) (noting a "growing
sentiment among commentators that there's something out of control with social media and internet
companies that needs to be brought back into control"); Jamie Condliffe, How to Fix Social Media 's
Big Problems? Lawmakers Have Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/07/30/business/dealbook/big-tech-regulation-ideas.html [https://perma.cc/KQN4-BLAE]
(discussing reports from the U.S. Senate and British House of Commons that both advocated for
new regulations of large tech companies, such as mandatory audits, liability for failures to take
down illegal content, and duties to remove fake accounts); Daniel Kreiss & Matt Perault, Four Ways
to Fix Social Media's Political Ads Problem-Without Banning Them, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/opinion/twitter-facebook-political-ads.html [https://perma
.cc/ZSC7-7JW4] (recommending "four common-sense changes to political advertising" on social
media, including "clear[er] enforcement mechanisms for violations of targeting policies"). But see
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: How FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND
UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 9 (2018) (questioning whether Facebook can be reformed because "the
problem with Facebook is Facebook"); JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR
SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS RIGHT NOW 22 (2018) (asserting that quitting social media "entirely is
the only option for change").
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platforms seem complicit in all sorts of social ills.3 And following years of
laissez-faire attitudes in legislatures, lawmakers are looking for ways to
regulate the technology companies that exert so much influence over our
lives.
Given that the "techlash" shows little sign of subsiding, reining in giant
online platforms might be our best hope for bipartisanship.4 When Senators
Elizabeth Warren and Ted Cruz agree on something, it's worth taking note.5
Even Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has conceded that the internet
"needs new rules."6
Federal politicians in the United States have so far failed to turn their
outrage into action, but federal judges have begun undermining an important
source of platform power. On the West Coast in California, a federal appeals
court issued a long-awaited ruling in hiQ v. Linkedln," giving a scrappy start-
up a win over a Big Tech behemoth.' Meanwhile, on the East Coast in
Washington, D.C., a federal district court decided Sandvig v. Barr,9 freeing
academics and journalists to conduct research that platforms have tried
3. For my purposes, I adopt Tarleton Gillespie's definition of "platforms" as being online sites
and services that "host, organize, and circulate users' shared content or social interactions for them,"
without having produced the bulk of that content themselves, built on an infrastructure for
processing data for "customer service, advertising, and profit." TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS
OF THE INTERNET 18 (2018). While many of the rules, analyses, and recommendations in this Essay
would apply to all online sites and services, I've generally chosen to highlight platforms for three
reasons. First, "Big Tech" platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon have gained significant
influence in our society and, as a result, have attracted the interest of the legislators and researchers
who are among my primary audiences. Second, these platforms have been particularly aggressive
in enforcing their rights as digital gatekeepers under cyber-trespass law. And third, my
recommendations regarding interoperability are most relevant to the types of platforms that host
third-party content, including in online groups and messaging services.
4. See Rana Foroohar, Year in a Word: Techlash, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018), https://
www.ft.com/content/76578fba-fcal-11e8-ac00-57a2a826423e [https://perma.cc/N9MQ-BVZV]
(defining "techlash" as "[t]he growing public animosity towards large Silicon Valley platform
technology companies and their Chinese equivalents").
5. Ben Brody, Ted Cruz Echoes Elizabeth Warren's Criticism of Facebook's Power,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2019, 2:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-12
/ted-cruz-retweets-elizabeth-warren-s-criticism-of-facebook-power [https://perma.cc/578X-
ZZZA].
6. Mark Zuckerberg, Mark Zuckerberg: The Internet Needs New Rules. Let's Start in These




7. 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019).
8. Id. at 1005.
9. 451 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 20-5153 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2020).
9532021]
Texas Law Review
to block.10  Experts agree that these "bombshell"" decisions are
"groundbreaking" and "a really big deal."12 The rulings could have influence
far beyond Silicon Valley and the Nation's Capital because they concern "the
law that threatens to swallow the internet,"13 better known as the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).14
The CFAA is a federal cyber-trespass law that makes it illegal to
"access" a website "without authorization" and obtain "information."" In
both hiQ and Sandvig, the courts considered whether platforms like Linkedln
and Amazon could use the CFAA to stop people from gathering information
from their websites. By clearing the way for large-scale data collection from
websites that are "open" to the general public, the decisions contradicted
longstanding precedents in other jurisdictions.16 This twist should interest
anyone who uses the internet, but it should especially interest Congress.
Why? Because the new hiQ rule shows it's high time to pass new laws.
While these recent decisions reveal tensions in the regulatory schemes
that govern the internet, the stakes go far beyond the particular cases. Under
cyber-trespass laws like the CFAA, some courts have treated platforms as
10. Id.; see also Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2018) (outlining how
platforms prohibit certain research activities through their terms of service); Jeff Horwitz, Facebook
Seeks Shutdown ofNYU Research Project into Political Ad Targeting, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2020,
8:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-seeks-shutdown-of-nyu-research-project-into-
political-ad-targeting-11603488533 [https://perma.cc/4BVV-2EQS] (reporting on Facebook's
attempts to shut down an academic research project on targeted political advertising by threatening
researchers with "enforcement action").
11. Laurent Sacharoff, Criminal Trespass and Computer Crime, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571,
574 (2020).
12. Orin S. Kerr, Scraping a Public Website Doesn't Violate the CFAA, Ninth Circuit (Mostly)
Holds, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 9, 2019, 7:22 PM), https://reason.com/2019/09/09/scraping-a-
public-website-doesnt-violate-the-cfaa-ninth-circuit-mostly-holds [https://perma.cc/7R5C-CCZT]
(unpacking the "hugely important" decision in hiQ).
13. Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 415, 423.
14. Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology [https://perma
.cc/MX4M-PHMY] (dubbing the CFAA "the worst law in technology" and "the most outrageous
criminal law you've never heard of," while arguing that its "egregiously overbroad" provisions are
"a nightmare for a country that calls itself free").
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2018). Similar laws now exist in all fifty states and over forty
foreign countries. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization"
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1597 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Cybercrime's
Scope]; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1017
(2001) (noting that "when Vermont enacted a statute proscribing computer crime in 1999, it became
the fiftieth state to devote specific legislation to computer crimes"); Mary W. S. Wong, Cyber-
Trespass and 'Unauthorized Access' as Legal Mechanisms of Access Control: Lessons from the US
Experience, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 90, 115-24 (2007) (discussing similarities between cyber-
trespass laws in the United States and other countries); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(2) (West 2011)
(outlining criminal prohibitions for anyone who "accesses and without permission takes, copies, or
makes use of any data" from a computer network).
16. See infra Part I.
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digital gatekeepers-as property owners that may permit and restrict access
to their websites much like landowners may do with private land in the real
world." If platforms withhold their consent through words or inference,
cyber-trespass laws let them enforce their preferences about who may access
their services and gather information from the internet.
This is but one way that platforms act as "gatekeepers." Other scholars
have used this terminology to capture different features of private control in
the digital age. Rory Van Loo, for example, has called platforms the "New
Gatekeepers" to describe how administrative agencies increasingly conscript
them to "perform the duties of public regulator" and police other
businesses.18 Scholars like Danielle Citron, meanwhile, have used the
terminology in the context of content moderation, observing that the internet
"has many different digital gatekeepers"-from internet service providers to
search engines to social media-that "have substantial freedom to decide
whether and when to tackle" harms like cyber-harassment by deciding what
content appears on their websites.19 Relatedly, Eli Pariser has invoked the
gatekeeper language to describe how platforms exercise editorial control over
the news and information we consume, replacing the "old gatekeepers" that
ran traditional broadcast and print media.20 And other scholars have used it
17. See generally Thomas E. Kadri, Platforms as Blackacres, 68 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
2021), https://ssm.com/abstract=3742086 (exploring the First Amendment implications of
gatekeeper rights under cyber-trespass law).
18. Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. L. REV.
467,467-68,482-84 (2020) [hereinafter Van Loo, New Gatekeepers].
19. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 227-36 (2014); see also Thomas
E. Kadri, Networks of Empathy, 2020 UTAH L. REv. 1075, 1081-92 (proposing ways that platforms
could alter their design and values to tackle digital abuse); Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns & Christian
Katzenbach, Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in the
Automation of Platform Governance, BIG DATA & SOC'Y, Feb. 28, 2020, at 1, 12 (discussing how
"companies like Facebook now can boast of proactively removing 99.6% of terrorist propaganda"
to legitimize "both their technical expertise and their role as a gatekeeper protecting a 'community"'
(citation omitted)); Mark Bunting, From Editorial Obligation to Procedural Accountability: Policy
Approaches to Online Content in the Era of Information Intermediaries, 3 J. CYBER POL'Y 165, 172
(2018) (observing that online speech policies "are enforced by armies of human moderators, who
work as 'digital gatekeepers' for platforms, interpreting standards and guidelines, reviewing vast
amounts of deeply unpleasant content, and becoming critical arbiters and adjudicators of which
content violates rules, norms or law"). For a foundational take on the history of online gatekeeping
and its relationship to legislative and judicial forbearance in regulating information technology, see
generally Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2006).
See also Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy,
2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) (providing an influential framework for when to impose gatekeeper
liability on private parties who might be in a position to disrupt misconduct).
20. Eli Pariser, When the Internet Thinks It Knows You, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2011), https://
www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/opinion/23pariser.html [https://perma.cc/BRV5-L9VR]. See
generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 176-272 (2006) (exploring how information consumption
in the networked public sphere functions differently from obtaining information through
commercial mass media in the twentieth century).
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when discussing antitrust concerns related to the power of digital platforms
to control access to particular goods, markets, or people.2 1
The gatekeeper terminology has even made its way to Congress. In July
2020, at the long-awaited congressional hearings about allegedly anti-
competitive practices by Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook,
Representative David Cicilline gave his damning assessment: "As
gatekeepers to the digital economy, these platforms enjoy the power to pick
winners and losers, shake down small businesses and enrich themselves
while choking off competitors.... Our founders would not bow before a
king. Nor should we bow before the emperors of the online economy."22
These scholars and lawmakers call platforms "gatekeepers" principally
to describe their design features, private rules, and business practices.23 In
this Essay, I explore a distinct but linked angle of platforms' gatekeeper
role-one that focuses on how cyber-trespass law empowers them with legal
rights of inclusion and exclusion over information on websites. Anxious
about reputations and profits, platforms have touted their gatekeeper ights to
scare and sue those seeking to use their websites against their wishes.24 This
legal regime affects all sorts of actors-from academics to journalists to
businesses to consumers-who want to engage with the platforms' websites,
even when they're open to the public or when people permit complementary
services to access their accounts.25 HiQ and Sandvig represent steps in the
other direction, but platforms continue to enjoy power as digital gatekeepers
in other jurisdictions across the country.
This Essay challenges the law's current embrace of gatekeeper ights.
Applying cyber-trespass law across the entire internet has empowered private
platforms to become public policymakers in unintended and unchecked ways,
letting them establish and enforce the internet's accessibility and
21. See, e.g., Peter Alexiadis & Alexandre de Streel, Designing an EU Intervention Standard
for Digital Platforms 5-6 (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 2020
/14, 2020), https://ssm.com/abstract=-3544694 (discussing "digital gatekeepers" in the context of
antitrust concerns); see also Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1321
(2017) [hereinafter Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator] (describing digital intermediaries as
"potentially manipulative and deceptive machines serving as market gatekeepers").
22. Cecilia Kang & David McCabe, Lawmakers, United in Their Ire, Lash Out at Big Tech's
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/technology/big-tech-
hearing-apple-amazon-facebook-google.html [https://perma.cc/2MEH-ARNK].
23. The main exception is Van Loo, whose work has revealed the regulatory gatekeeper function
of "Big Tech" platforms under administrative law. See Van Loo, New Gatekeepers, upra note 18,
at 467-68, 482-84 (describing how the Federal Trade Commission has pressured Amazon and
Facebook to engage in regulation of third parties). My focus, by contrast, is on platforms' legal
gatekeeper ole under criminal and tort law.
24. See infra Parts I & II; see also Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker, The Challenges and
Opportunities for Social Media Research, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE STATE OF THE
FIELD AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 313, 321 (Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020)
(discussing how decisions like hiQ implicate the ability of academic researchers to study platforms).
25. See infra Part II.
[Vol. 99:951956
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informational rules. To borrow from an old proverb, we've let the foxes guard
the henhouses.26 But it's not too late to adopt a different legal regime-one
that defers far less to private companies. Safiya Umoja Noble has taught us
that "the very concept of community control on the web is increasingly
becoming negligible" as we move toward an "increasingly privately
controlled, neoliberal communication sphere."27 While our legal rules don't
explain this shift entirely, they're an important factor. But as Anupam
Chander urged in this journal's pages nearly twenty years ago, "we should
not view any rule as natural" and should instead critically assess "the
principles governing the distribution of entitlements to property" on the
internet.28 It's time to heed his call.
After exploring the nature of platforms' gatekeeper ights under cyber-
trespass law, this Essay offers a three-part legislative framework to curtail
their power. To begin, Congress should amend the CFAA to clarify that
cyber-trespass laws don't apply on websites that are accessible to the general
public. Congress should then mandate and shield certain forms of
interoperability between platforms, repealing or preempting laws that
platforms use to thwart complementary interconnection with other services.
Finally, Congress should pass targeted laws to regulate the collection and use
of publicly accessible information on websites, plugging a hole that decisions
like hiQ have created. Taking these three steps will change the locus of
governance in key internet policy choices, stripping private platforms of the
unbounded and trans-substantive decisionmaking power they currently
enjoy. Although this regulatory agenda is ambitious, these are the kinds of
fundamental and structural changes needed to protect privacy, speech, and
consumer interests in the digital age.
The Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I explores the genesis of
platforms' gatekeeper ights and then examines the recent judicial skepticism
of these rights. Part II demonstrates how gatekeeper ights allow platforms to
enforce their preferences on a range of policies at the core of internet
governance. Part III then outlines a three-part legislative agenda to regulate
and restrain digital gatekeepers.
I. Platforms as Gatekeepers
When John Perry Barlow typed his famed Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace in 1996, he proclaimed that cyberspace was a
"global social space" where property laws "do not apply" because they "are
26. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
27. SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: How SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE
RACISM 92 (2018).
28. Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 715, 719-21 (2003) (making
this argument in the context of critiquing first-come, first-served property rules governing domain
names on the internet).
9572021]
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all based on matter, and there is no matter here."29 Barlow's utopian rhetoric
overlooked the CFAA, a federal law that had already been on the books for
a decade.
Barlow might have wished that cyberspace was immune from property
law, but the CFAA borrowed from the ancient concept of trespass to prohibit
unauthorized "access" to computer networks.30 The statute imposes criminal
and tort liability on anyone who "accesses a computer without authorization"
and "obtains ... information."" Through many twists and turns, this
language has created powerful gatekeeper ights over websites. This Part
recounts how.
A. Legislative Endorsement of Gatekeeper Rights
Our story begins in 1983 at Camp David. Amid Cold War tensions,
President Ronald Reagan screened WarGames, a sci-fi movie about a
teenager who brings the world to the verge of World War III after mistaking
the Pentagon's online weapons system for a computer game.32 President
Reagan later interrupted a meeting to quiz his generals about the plot's
plausibility." Prompted in part by his concerns, Congress then passed the
CFAA to "deter[] the criminal element from abusing computer
technology."34 Though the law initially covered only financial records
obtained from a narrow set of computer networks, Congress repealed these
limitations over time.35 The upshot is that the CFAA now governs all of us
29. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/ER9Q-
BDGW].
30. Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 573, 576 n.26 (detailing how the CFAA "criminalizes the simple
act of computer trespass" and noting that "Congress intended courts to analogize the CFAA to state
criminal trespass laws"); United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 525 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that "the
legislative history consistently characterizes the evil to be remedied-computer crime-as
'trespass"'); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 10 (1984) (discussing the problem of hackers who
gain "access (trespass into)" computers and debating legislation to address a "flurry of electronic
trespass[es]").
31. 18 U.S.C. @ 1030(a)(2), (c), (g); see also Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 713
(2016) (describing the CFAA's prohibition on "improperly accessing a protected computer").
32. Gabe Rottman, Knight Institute's Facebook 'Safe Harbor' Proposal Showcases Need for
Comprehensive CFAA Reform, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://
www.rcfp.org/knight-institutes-facebook-safe-harbor-proposal-showcases-need-compr [https://
perma.cc/93VN-2MLT].
33. Id.; see also STEPHANIE RICKER SCHULTE, CACHED: DECODING THE INTERNET IN GLOBAL
POPULAR CULTURE 21-54 (2013) (exploring the influence of the WarGames storyline in many
cyber-related policy debates in the 1980s).
34. H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 4 (1984).
35. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN.
L. REv. 1561, 1564-71 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Vagueness Challenges] (providing the history
behind this statutory creep); Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 580-81 (same).
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whenever we use the internet.36 A person "need not have a bad motive or an
intent to gain, nor cause any harm or damage to the computer or its owner."37
Rather, the law can kick in as soon as you visit any website and view any
information.38
In practice,39 the only meaningful constraint in the CFAA's legal
framework-"the distinguishing line between legal and prison"-is whether
you visit a website "without authorization."0 These two words have
36. See Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 578 n.30 (explaining that the definition of "protected
computers" under the CFAA "effectively includes any computer connected to the internet, and even
perhaps some that are not" (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2))); see also Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope,
supra note 15, at 1663 n.284 (observing that "[t]he term 'protected computer' is defined extremely
broadly to include essentially every computer connected to the Internet"); Jack Dahm, Note, No
Internet Does Not Mean No Protection Under the CFAA: Why Voting Machines Should Be Covered
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1775, 1790-91 (2019) (arguing that the CFAA
covers some computers not connected to the internet).
37. Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 573.
38. See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6 (1986) (noting that the statute's "obtaining information"
language includes the "mere observation of the data"); Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding,
Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 648 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (explaining that "[v]iewing
material on a computer screen constitutes 'obtaining' information under the CFAA"); Sacharoff,
supra note 11, at 578 (arguing that the "obtaining information" element "adds almost nothing"
because "observing information suffices"). See generally Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note
35, at 1568, 1571, 1577 (observing that the CFAA appears to cover "every computer connected to
the Internet" located anywhere in the world).
39. I give this qualifier in part because of an insightful new article by Laurent Sacharoff that
explores another possible constraint within the statute itself: the mens rea requirement that a
defendant knowingly access the information without authorization. Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 598-
607. Sacharoff mounts a persuasive case that courts and scholars have overlooked this limitation
and unwisely focused on the meaning of "without authorization." I share his hope that the mens rea
requirement could constrain troubling cyber-trespass liability, but even he acknowledges that courts
have so far shown no signs of limiting the CFAA's reach on this basis. See id. at 574, 587-99
(describing how courts "misdiagnose the problem as arising from the element 'without
authorization' and propose the wrong solution in the form of a code-based test"); see also Kerr,
Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REv. 1143, 1180 (2016) [hereinafter Kerr, Norms]
(observing that "[c]ourts have not explored the role of mental state in establishing liability for
computer trespass"); William A. Hall, Jr., The Ninth Circuit's Deficient Examination of the
Legislative History of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in United States v. Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1523, 1528-31 (2016) (emphasizing how one court failed to grapple with the mental state
necessary to sustain CFAA liability); cf David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating:
Reconstructing the CFAA Intent Requirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907,945-47 (2013)
(proposing a legislative amendment to the required mental state for CFAA liability).
40. See Jennifer Granick, Towards Learning from Losing Aaron Swartz, STAN. CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC'Y (Jan. 14, 2013, 4:37 PM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/towards-
learning-losing-aaron-swartz [https://perma.cc/G8V2-QE74] (emphasis added) (explaining why the
CFAA is "one of [her] biggest concerns" as a former criminal defense lawyer). A second form of
unauthorized access under the CFAA is when a person "exceeds authorized access." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(2) (2018). This Essay focuses principally on instances when access is "without
authorization" because that prong is more commonly invoked when "outsiders" access websites
without the platform's permission, but many of the same principles are at play under both theories
of liability. See United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1033-34, 1036 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2016)
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generated considerable controversy. While the Second Circuit has declared
that they are words "of common usage, without any technical or ambiguous
meaning,"41 others have complained that Congress's failure to define them is
the law's "original sin." 42 Jennifer Granick, for example, has bemoaned that
"authorization" under the CFAA is in the "eye of the beholder."4 3
Granick's complaint has a twofold meaning-one descriptive, one
conceptual. In a descriptive sense, she observes that courts have endorsed
numerous and conflicting indicators of when access is unauthorized and
therefore illegal." This doctrinal mishmash has costs: courts may issue
contradictory decisions on what the law prohibits; prosecutors may charge
broadly to secure indictments and gain leverage in plea negotiations; and
private actors may threaten litigation based on inconsistent theories of
liability.45 In the end, people are puzzled about what will land them in hot
water.
In a conceptual sense, Granick's complaint gets to the heart of the
CFAA's structure. "Authorization" is in the "eye of the beholder" because
the CFAA gives each website owner the autocratic power to decide whether
someone's access to its website is allowed. Granick sees this as a bug because
it gives website owners unchecked power to "unilaterally decide what is right
and wrong" and then use "the full force of federal law" to enforce their
wishes.46 But others see this as a feature. Just as real-world trespass liability
turns on whether property owners want you on their land, so too cyber-
trespass liability turns on whether website owners want you on their
websites.47 Laurent Sacharoff, for example, has argued that the term "without
authorization" is "perfectly comprehensible"-it means "keep off' or "stay
(distinguishing between the "without authorization" and "exceeds authorization" provisions as
applying respectively to "outsiders" and "insiders"); WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller,
687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the distinction between the two theories of
liability "is arguably minute"); Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006)
(observing that the distinction is often "paper thin").
41. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991); accord Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1028
(concluding that "without 'authorization' is "an unambiguous, nontechnical term that, given its
plain and ordinary meaning, means accessing a protected computer without permission").
42. Rottman, supra note 32; see also Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y, Fall 2012, at 1, 25-27 (lamenting the lack of statutory definition and
proposing language that Congress could adopt).
43. Granick, supra note 40.
44. Id.
45. See CITRON, supra note 19, at 187-88 (raising some of these concerns in the context of
discussing a famous CFAA case, United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009)).
46. Granick, supra note 40.




out." 48 In his view, "courts have taken a plain-meaning term, 'without
authorization,' and made it vague."4 9
James Grimmelmann has made similar observations. Drawing lessons
from analogous laws that incorporate notions of permission, he's astutely
argued that the term "without authorization" doesn't refer to "what a
computer user does" but rather "what a computer owner says about those
uses."5 0 To ask if the CFAA prohibits or allows X poses a question "at the
wrong level of abstraction" because the issue "is not whether X is allowed,
but whether X is allowed by the computer's owner."" By design, the CFAA
"does not of its own force define a class of prohibited conduct, because
literally any conduct in relation to a computer could be either authorized or
unauthorized."" Altering headlines on the Los Angeles Times website, for
example, could be an unauthorized act of cyber-vandalism when done by a
prankster, but it's an authorized act of cyber-maintenance when undone by
the newspaper's editors.53 It's all about consent.54
But how do courts determine consent under cyber-trespass laws like the
CFAA? To answer this question, it helps to dip into traditional trespass law.
A key concept in property law is that landowners enjoy the right to exclude
48. Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 575, 610 (citations omitted); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.2(a) (3d ed. 2018) (asserting that "without authorization" in
trespass law means entry is "forbidden"); Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework
for the Crime of Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1478-79 (2016) (arguing that
"authorization" under the CFAA "has the same meaning as authorization under criminal physical
trespass laws"); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (observing that a person
becomes a trespasser once they're warned to "keep off" the owner's property); Bowman v. United
States, 212 A.2d 610, 611 (D.C. 1965) (same).
49. Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 577.
50. Grimmelmann, supra note 47, at 1501.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also James Grimmelmann, Computer Crime Law Goes to the Casino,
LABORATORIUM (May 2, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2013/05/02/
computer-crime law goestothecasino [https://perma.cc/7JRU-YNEM) ("The problem with the
CFAA is not some recent mutation of a law that has outgrown its original purpose. The problem
was there all along; it was inherent in the very project of the CFAA.").
53. This hypothetical isn't all that hypothetical. See United States v. Keys, 703 F. App'x 472,
474 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming the conviction of a journalist charged with turning over login
credentials to a hacker who altered a headline on the Los Angeles Times website); Joseph Serna &
Stephen Ceasar, Former Reuters Social Media Editor Convicted of Aiding L.A. Times Hack, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015, 4:54 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-matthew-keys-
convicted-hacking-la-times-20151007-story.html [https://perma.cc/K8TE-4X9L] (summarizing the
events leading up to the CFAA conviction).
54. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn & Stephanie K. Pell, Broken, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 479, 519-
26 (2019) (discussing factual and legal consent in the context of the CFAA); Pulte Homes, Inc. v.
Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2011) ("Commonly understood,... a




others from their land.55 This right is better articulated as a "gatekeeper right,"
for it's as much about inclusion as it is about exclusion.5 6 Landowners
generally have the right to determine who has access to their property, on
what terms, and for what reasons.57 As a gatekeeper, you can invite me into
your home but then tell me to leave; you can set rules and kick me out if I
break them; you can summon the police or sue me if I linger too long; and
you can arbitrarily deny me access while granting it to others.58 This
gatekeeper right is especially powerful on private property. If you don't
consent to my presence in your home, for example, you may exclude me for
any reason whatsoever with the backing of trespass law.59 Your discretion is
absolute.
Because trespass liability turns on a landowner's consent, they must
give notice of what's forbidden. In the real world, this generally happens in
three ways: through actual notice, like the proverbial senior citizen yelling
"Get off my lawn!"; through constructive notice, like posting a "No Entry"
sign in a conspicuous spot; and through implicit notice, like erecting a
fence.t Gatekeepers may exercise their legal rights only if they provide
proper notice. No notice, no trespass.
55. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (holding that the right to
exclude is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property"); Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.");
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (describing the "right of property" as a "sole and
despotic dominion").
56. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 740, 744
(1998).
57. Id. at 740.
58. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 74 (1997) (asserting that the right of
property is "like a gate, not a wall" because it "permits the owner not only to make solitary use of
his property, by excluding all others, but also permits him to make a social use of his property, by
selectively excluding others, which is to say by selectively allowing some to enter"); Carol M. Rose,
Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone 's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 604 (1998) (explaining how
the right to exclude provides property owners with "decisionmaking authority" and "a small domain
of complete mastery, complete self-direction, and complete protection from the whims of others").
59. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159-60 (Wis. 1997) (describing the
"long recognized" right of a property owner to exclude others from private property for any purpose
that does not infringe on another's rights); Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9
RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954) (setting forth the proposition that property involves the right to
exclude others unless the owner consents, with such consent being given or withheld at the owner's
discretion).
60. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (establishing that notice
against trespass can be given by actual communication, posting, or physical enclosure designed to
keep out intruders); Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 157, 161, 164 (providing an example of actual notice
by a landowner who told trespassers not to come onto his property); C.B.S. v. State, 184 So. 3d 611,
614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing statutory requirements for constructive notice by posting
signs under Florida law). There will be times when these forms of notice overlap. If an intruder sees
a "no trespass" sign, for example, it makes sense to talk about them having actual notice. Likewise,
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Relying on the cyberspace metaphor,61 courts have interpreted the
CFAA in harmony with traditional trespass laws by granting platforms
gatekeeper ights over their websites.62 Under the law in many jurisdictions,
a platform may use the CFAA to prohibit people from accessing its website
even if it's otherwise open to the general public and even if the platform's
user permits complementary services to access their account.63 Platforms
may selectively enforce their rules, letting some people gather information
while forbidding others." And platforms may collect information
themselves, selling or trading it for their own benefit. As digital gatekeepers,
that is their privilege.65
The harmony between realspace and cyberspace goes further because
courts have effectively recognized cyber-analogs for each form of real-world
notice.66 In many jurisdictions, platforms may give actual notice by sending
the line between constructive and implicit notice is especially fuzzy when states outline types of
fencing that will satisfy the notice requirement for trespass claims. See, e.g., V.B. v. State, 959 So.
2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (describing the "constructive notice" that an intruder might
have if a landowner erected "a fence of substantial construction" that "stands at least 3 feet in height"
(citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.011(7) (2006)). Again, it might make sense to describe notice by
fencing as "constructive" when assessing adherence to predetermined statutory requirements for
fencing to provide legally sufficient notice, even if it generally makes more sense to think of fencing
providing "implicit" notice because it conveys the owner's lack of consent to intruders by
implication, as compared to the forms of actual and constructive notice that tend to be explicit.
61. The wisdom and implications of the cyberspace metaphor have been explored and "hotly
contested" by scholars for many years. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 210, 210-26 (2007) (describing and critiquing literature in this space). I share
concerns about the metaphor raised by Julie Cohen and others, but I leave further discussion for
other work. See Kadri, supra note 17, at 34-35.
62. See Orin S. Kerr, Trespass, Not Fraud: The Need for New Sentencing Guidelines in CFAA
Cases, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1544, 1545-46 (2016) (discussing how "[m]ost CFAA offenses are
trespass offenses" because the "primary harm in most CFAA cases is invasion of privacy and
interference with the right to exclude").
63. See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62-64 (1st Cir. 2003)
(upholding a preliminary injunction pursuant to the CFAA that precluded defendant from using a
"scraper" to collect data from a company's public website); Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318
F. Supp. 2d 435, 439-40 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (finding the operator of a public website alleged
sufficient facts to state a CFAA claim by saying that it had "directly informed" defendant that
scraping was prohibited); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1062-63, 1067-
68 (9th Cir. 2016) (ruling that defendant acted "without authorization" under the CFAA when it
accessed Facebook user information after receiving Facebook's demand not do to so, even though
the Facebook users had consented to defendant's access).
64. See Facebook, 844 F.3d at 1067-68 (finding that a cease-and-desist letter explicitly revoked
defendant's permission to continue using Facebook's website and that its further use of the website
ran afoul of the CFAA); United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2016)
(acknowledging the "exclusive discretion" of an owner to "issue or revoke access" to a website
under the CFAA).
65. Though perhaps it shouldn't be. See infra Part II.
66. For a more in-depth discussion of this harmony, see Kadri, supra note 17, at 15-18, 20-25.
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cease-and-desist letters that explicitly forbid access to their websites,67 they
may give constructive notice by listing rules in their terms of service,68 and
they may give implicit notice by creating technological barriers to accessing
their websites.69 If you fail to heed any of these warnings from a platform,
you're in trouble.
67. See, e.g., Facebook, 844 F.3d at 1067-68 (holding that CFAA liability was triggered by a
letter that "revoked explicitly" defendant's permission to access Facebook's website); Craigslist
Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969-70, 970 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that CFAA
liability was triggered by a letter that included "clear statements" that "specifically denied
[defendants'] authorization to use the website 'for any purposes"'); Sw. Airlines Co., 318 F. Supp.
2d at 439-40 (holding that CFAA liability was triggered by "repeated warnings and requests" that
"directly informed" defendant to stop accessing the website); CouponCabin, Inc. v. PriceTrace,
LLC, No. 18-7525, 2019 WL 1572448, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2019) (holding that CFAA
liability was triggered by a letter revoking defendant's permission to access a website); see also EF
Cultural Travel BV, 318 F.3d at 62-64 (explaining that CFAA liability could be triggered by a clear
statement on a website's homepage saying "no scrapers may be used" because such a statement
would provide "fair warning" that automatically gathering information from the website was
prohibited).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 461-62, 467 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding
that CFAA liability was triggered through defendant's violation of a platform's rules prohibiting
lies about one's age or identity, before ultimately overturning the conviction on constitutional
grounds); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that
CFAA liability was triggered through defendant's violation of an internet provider's policies);
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 597 F. App'x 116, 130 (3d Cir. 2015) (suggesting that
CFAA liability could be triggered if defendants "breach[ed] any ... contractual term of use"); see
also Wu, supra note 14 (discussing CFAA prosecution of Aaron Swartz based "on a terms-of-
service violation"); United States v. Lowson, No. 10-114, 2010 WL 9552416, at *5-6 (D.N.J.
Oct. 12, 2010) (discussing a CFAA prosecution based in part on defendant's alleged violations of
policies outlined in a website's terms of service); United States v. Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192, 1198,
1208 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (U.S. argued Nov. 30, 2020) (No. 19-
783) (affirming a police officer's CFAA conviction after the officer used police database for
personal reasons even though officers were "trained on the proper and improper uses of the system"
and officer admitted his actions were "wrong"); EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., 703 F. App'x 803,
808 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (stating that "one of the lessons from [circuit precedent] may be that a
person exceeds authorized access if he or she uses the access in a way that contravenes any policy
or term of use governing the computer in question"). As with real-world trespass, the lines between
actual and constructive notice in CFAA cases can blur, especially when an alleged cyber-trespasser
is aware that their conduct runs afoul of a website owner's rules. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 10, 26-27 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing potential CFAA liability when researchers are
aware that their activities will violate a website's terms of service). The important point, however,
is that courts accepting this form of notice will generally do so without requiring proof that the
computer user is actually aware of the rules.
69. See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV, 318 F.3d at 63 ("[L]ack of authorization may be implicit,
rather than explicit. After all, password protection itself normally limits authorization by implication
(and technology), even without express terms."); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.
Supp. 2d 1025, 1038-39 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (accepting Facebook's argument that "circumvent[ing]
technical barriers"-specifically, taking steps to evade the blocking of IP addresses-constitutes
"access[ing] the site 'without permission"' and triggers liability under the CFAA); Craigslist, 942
F. Supp. 2d at 969-70 (accepting Craigslist's argument that "[d]efendants' continued use of
Craigslist" despite the "technological measures to block them constitutes unauthorized access under
the statute"); see also CollegeSource, 597 F. App'x at 130 (suggesting that defendants could be
prosecuted under the CFAA if they "breach[] any technological barrier").
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Real-world trespass law has generally had more nuance than cyber-
trespass law. Landowners may usually exclude people easily and arbitrarily,
but not always. Though this oversimplifies current doctrine and glosses over
the heroic struggles that led to it,70 we can loosely say that it becomes harder
to exercise your real-world gatekeeper ights if you allow more people on
your land.71 Not only are certain reasons for exclusion impermissible, but the
type of notice might need to be more direct and personal.7 2 On the internet,
however, courts have often applied what I've called the blackacre principle
of cyber-trespass law: if you provide notice that you forbid access to your
website, you may use your gatekeeper ights to exclude anyone from it for
any reason whatsoever with the backing of criminal and tort law.73 At its core,
that's the power of a digital gatekeeper.
This jurisprudence has effectively made it "illegal-indeed, criminal-
to seek information from a publicly available website" against the website
owner's wishes.74 As one court has remarked, the CFAA's structure makes it
"primarily a statute imposing limits on access and enhancing control by
information providers" like platforms.75 Mark Lemley recognized long ago
how this consent-based framework could create a "serious problem" in the
digital age,76 and concerns have only deepened as platforms have
increasingly used the CFAA to police the internet-and as courts have
invited them to do so.77 More recently, Jane Bambauer has questioned the
CFAA's constitutionality under the First Amendment because it applies
"serious civil and criminal penalties to anybody who accesses a website for
70. See generally Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 621-24, 642-43 (discussing the impact of the
1964 Civil Rights Act on contemporary trespass law).
71. See, e.g., id. at 616 (detailing how states often add an extra trespass element for places open
to the public-like shopping malls, parks, and stores-by requiring "personally communicated"
notice to any would-be trespasser (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW 140.00(5) (McKinney 2020))); cf Tim
Wu, It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad Disney World, NEW YORKER (Jan. 22, 2013), https://
www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/its-a-mad-mad-mad-mad-disney-world [https://
perma.cc/J6T6-4PEW] (raising the possibility that the makers of indie movie Escape from
Tomorrow committed trespass if their filming inside Disney World violated Disney's rules).
72. See Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 622-23 (describing how the presumption that a person has
a license to enter a public place like a shopping mall can be superseded if that person has been issued
a written ban).
73. Kadri, supra note 17, at 15.
74. Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 521, 528 (2003) (criticizing the
use of browsewrap licenses to trigger CFAA liability).
75. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003).
76. Lemley, supra note 74, at 528; see also Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117
MICH. L. REv. 815, 838, 872 (2019) [hereinafter Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection] (arguing that
courts should refrain from applying the CFAA to block access to publicly accessible information).
77. See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV, 318 F.3d at 64 (encouraging "public website providers ...
to say just what non-password protected access they purport to forbid"); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps
Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (stating that the court would assume that the
CFAA's broad language allows websites to restrict access to information that is otherwise public
information, at least "until the Ninth Circuit holds otherwise").
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a purpose that violates the website's terms of service, even when the website
is available to the public without password protection."78 Although some
courts have ruled that terms-of-service violations alone can't sustain CFAA
liability, platforms may still exaggerate this theory's continued viability and
revitalize it through cease-and-desist letters that courts will never see.79
Yet despite these concerns, both prosecutors and platforms have
repeatedly argued that websites are "merely private property," meaning that
"[a] platform can deny access to anyone it wishes, for any reason."80 This
argument flows quite logically if you accept the premise that websites are
like private land in the real world: "If the government criminalizes a person
who accesses such a website in violation of the website's rules, they have
merely criminalized a trespass analogous to a criminal trespass in the real
world that would occur if a person refused to leave the premises after being
told to leave,"8 ' or so the argument goes. But should the law grant platforms
these gatekeeper ights? I have my doubts, as do some courts.
B. Judicial Skepticism of Gatekeeper Rights
This brings us back to the two cases mentioned in our introduction. The
hiQ v. Linkedln dispute arose because Linkedln wanted to prevent hiQ from
gathering information that people published on their publicly accessible
LinkedIn profiles.82 HiQ relied on this information to conduct statistical
analyses and provide business insights. For example, one hiQ service
predicted which employees were likely to be recruited by other companies,
enabling employers to offer perks like retention bonuses to help keep
valuable personnel.8 3 Another hiQ service summarized employee skills,
78. Jane R. Bambauer, The Empirical First Amendment, 78 OHIo ST. L.J. 947, 957 (2017)
(raising the possibility of a First Amendment challenge to the CFAA); see also Jacquellena Carrero,
Note, Access Granted: A First Amendment Theory of Reform of the CFAA Access Provision, 120
COLUM. L. REv. 131, 165-66 (2020) (arguing that Congress should amend the CFAA in order to
protect various competing First Amendment interests). I explore these First Amendment questions
in Kadri, supra note 17, at 5-7, while others have discussed alternative constitutional challenges to
cyber-trespass law elsewhere. See, e.g., Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as
a Problem ofPrivate Nondelegation, 127 HARv. L. REv. 751, 755 (2013) (analyzing court decisions
suggesting that broad CFAA interpretations render the statute unconstitutionally vague).
79. Compare United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859-62 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding
that violations of website policies can't trigger CFAA liability because such a rule would create
"[s]ignificant notice problems"), with Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058,
1067 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing this doctrinal limitation because the website policies were
reiterated in a cease-and-desist letter to provide defendant notice).
80. Laurent Sacharoff, Russia Gave Bots a Bad Name. Here's Why We Need Them More Than




82. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. Linkedln Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2019).
83. Id. at 991.
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helping employers identify gaps in their workforces and training programs.S4
Both services relied on information that hiQ obtained from Linkedln profiles
that were "visible to the general public."85 In order to collect this information
on a large scale, hiQ used automated bots to "scrape" LinkedIn's website.86
LinkedIn wasn't happy with hiQ's behavior. In a move no doubt
endorsed by in-house lawyers, the platform mounted a tripartite attack to give
notice that hiQ's scraping was forbidden. Linkedln gave actual notice by
sending hiQ a cease-and-desist letter declaring that "[a]ny future access of
any kind" to LinkedIn's website would violate the CFAA and be "without
permission and without authorization."8 7 It gave constructive notice by
posting rules on its website that prohibited anyone from collecting
information without first getting LinkedIn's "express permission."88 And it
gave implicit notice by implementing technical measures to restrict scraping
generally and block hiQ specifically from accessing its website.89 HiQ then
sought an injunction to stop LinkedIn from barring its access. The district
court sided with hiQ, issuing an order that left hiQ free to scrape the publicly
accessible portions of LinkedIn's website.90 The Ninth Circuit affirmed on
appeal, holding that there was at least a "serious question" as to whether
platforms can rely on the CFAA to restrict access to websites that are "open
to the general public."9 '
The hiQ ruling will be celebrated by academics and journalists who rely
on web scraping to do their research.92 Indeed, our second introductory case,
Sandvig v. Barr, involved a group of researchers challenging the CFAA's
applicability to their use of scraping to study housing and employment
discrimination.93 Two of the plaintiffs, Professors Alan Mislove and Christo
Wilson, wished to gather information from job-seeking websites to discover
whether potential candidates face discrimination based on their race or
gender.94 They and their Sandvig coplaintiffs conceded that he website
84. Id.
85. Id. at 990.
86. Id. at 991. "Scraping involves extracting data from a website and copying it into a structured
format, allowing for data manipulation or analysis." Id. at 991 n.3. Although scraping can be done
manually, it's typically done automatically by a web robot or "hot." Id.
87. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (alteration
in original).
88. hiQ Labs, 938 F.3d at 990-91, 991 n.5.
89. Id. at 990-92.
90. Id. at 992.
91. Id. at 1001-02.
92. See Persily & Tucker, supra note 24, at 321 (noting that "academic researchers often must
resort to scraping to get the information under platform control").
93. Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2018), sub nom. Sandvig v. Barr, 451
F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 20-5153 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2020).
94. Id. at 9-10.
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owners wouldn't consent to their research based on terms of service that
prohibit scraping and require permission before using the websites for
research purposes.95 Nonetheless, with the help of the American Civil
Liberties Union, the researchers sought a judgment that their research
activities would be legally permissible.96
In ruling on the government's motion to dismiss, the Sandvig court
explained that the researchers could challenge the CFAA's constitutionality
under the First Amendment because "attempts to record the contents of
public websites for research purposes are arguably affected with a First
Amendment interest."97 The court ultimately dodged many of the
constitutional claims, however, after concluding that the CFAA didn't
prohibit the researchers' attempts to gather information because "[s]craping
or otherwise recording data from a site that is accessible to the public is
merely a particular use of information that plaintiffs are entitled to see."98 As
a result, the court held, the researchers' "proposed activities fall outside the
CFAA's reach" because they involve "obtaining or using information that the
general public can access."99
The court in Sandvig later expanded on this ruling when deciding the
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. In a recent decision, the court
asserted that the CFAA's wording "contemplates a view of the internet as
divided into at least two realms-public websites (or portions of websites)
where no authorization is required and private websites (or portions of
websites) where permission must be granted for access."1'0 0 The court
approvingly quoted the Ninth Circuit's hiQ decision, explaining that "many
websites on the internet are open to public inspection" and that "a website
becomes 'private' only if it is 'delineated as private through use of a
permission requirement of some sort. "'101 Ultimately, the court held that the
CFAA applies "only when the user bypasses an authenticating permission
requirement, or an 'authentication gate,' such as a password restriction," and
not on publicly accessible websites.0 2 The upshot: the researchers couldn't
be liable for cyber-trespass for their planned scraping activities on websites
that are "open" to anyone.10 3
95. Id. at 10.
96. Id. at 7-8.
97. Id. at 16.
98. Id. at 26-27.
99. Id. at 17, 26.
100. Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F. Supp. 3d 73, 85 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 20-5153 (D.C.
Cir. May 28, 2020).
101. Id. (quoting hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedlIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2019)).




Given prior CFAA precedent, hiQ and Sandvig are quite remarkable
decisions.104 As we've seen, a slew of other courts had endorsed liability for
scraping publicly accessible websites, and prior cases had suggested that
platforms have broad powers to prevent access to their websites so long as
notice is clear. The First Circuit, for example, has declared that an explicit
"no scrapers may be used" statement on a website's homepage would trigger
CFAA liability by providing "fair warning" that automatically gathering
information from the website was prohibited.105 That court concluded that
website owners had unreviewable gatekeeper rights, declaring that "public
website providers ought to say just what non-password protected access they
purport to forbid" in order to get their way. 106
Even the Ninth Circuit had previously held that platforms could sustain
CFAA claims merely by providing written notice in a cease-and-desist
letter. 107 According to earlier decisions by that court, the entity that "own[s]
and control[s] access" to a computer network "retain[s] exclusive discretion
to issue or revoke access" to it under the CFAA.108
Platforms surely felt emboldened by these decisions. LinkedIn's
objection to hiQ was crystal clear when it "revoked permission" both
"explicitly" and "selectively" for hiQ to access its website.109 In other words,
Linkedln tried and failed to act as a gatekeeper. The hiQ court denied it that
power under the CFAA because LinkedIn's website was "open to the general
public,"" 0 and the Sandvig court adopted a similar posture." Now, with the
Supreme Court poised to construe the statute's "authorization" element this
term, we're at a fascinating juncture in cyber-trespass law." 2
104. See Noah Feldman, This Court Case Is Bad News for Social Media Privacy, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 5, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-05/facebook-
cambridge-analytica-and-a-new-free-speech-ruling [https://perma.cc/Z3AL-3UC2] (arguing that
the Sandvig court "made some fascinating and highly controversial new law" and that "[t]he
consequences are potentially vast"); Kerr, supra note 12 (asserting that hiQ is a "really important
decision that embraces the open presumption of the Internet far more clearly and directly than prior
cases").
105. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62-64 (1st Cir. 2003).
106. Id. at 64.
107. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1062-63, 1067-68 (9th Cir.
2016) (holding that Facebook could exclude another company from its website by sending a "written
notification" that Facebook denied the company permission to access it).
108. United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1029-30, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2016).
109. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. Linkedln Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1108-09 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
110. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1000 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that "[a]t
the very least ... hiQ has raised a serious question" as to whether the CFAA is "inapplicable" to
publicly accessible websites).
111. Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F. Supp. 3d 73, 85-89 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 20-5153 (D.C.
Cir. May 28, 2020).
112. See United States v. Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192, 1198, 1208 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (U.S. argued Nov. 30, 2020) (No. 19-783) (raising the question of what
counts as "exceeding authorized access" under the CFAA).
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II. Letting Foxes Guard Henhouses
Despite the newfound skepticism that gatekeeper rights apply on
publicly accessible websites, platforms still enjoy broad powers to exclude
under cyber-trespass precedents in many circuits.113 Given platforms' trans-
jurisdictional operations across the global internet, the legal landscape still
tilts in their favor. After all, the threat of liability is often all it takes for
platforms to get their way, and they can flex their muscles with cease-and-
desist letters that needn't provide citations to contrary precedents like hiQ
and Sandvig. While it's tempting to see recent events as revolutionary, it's
premature to assume that the tide has turned, especially because judicial
acceptance of scraping tends to come and go in waves.1 4 And although the
Supreme Court might bring some clarity to cyber-trespass law this term, it's
doubtful that this pending case will reach and resolve the many muddles in
existing doctrine. I have doubts about the statutory analysis in hiQ and
Sandvig,115  but my goal here isn't to judge competing CFAA
interpretations."11 Others have done so at length, and the Supreme Court
might move the goalposts quite soon."' Instead, I hope to lay the foundations
for legislative reform by showing that it's normatively desirable to chip away
at platforms' gatekeeper rights. Letting platforms serve as gatekeepers for
websites is a bit like letting foxes serve as guards for henhouses. Platforms,
like foxes, are likely to act in their own interests, and we should be cynical
113. See Kerr, supra note 12 (emphasizing that circuit splits remain regarding the proper
interpretation of the CFAA and "that only the U.S. Supreme Court can resolve" them).
114. Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
24 B.U. J. SCi. & TECH. L. 372, 378-81 (2018) (arguing that there have been four phases in courts'
jurisprudence on the question of whether the CFAA prohibits scraping); cf Kerr, supra note 12
(observing that "[t]he Ninth Circuit's approach to the CFAA has zigzagged a bit over time").
115. See Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 580-81, 644 (arguing that "the only defensible
interpretation of the CFAA" doesn't support the public-private distinction in hiQ, especially after
Congress "wiped away any such division between private and public information" by amending the
CFAA over the years). It's worth noting that the hiQ and Sandvig courts reached similar prescriptive
ends through different interpretive means, at least at first. While the Ninth Circuit in hiQ focused
on textual and historical indications that the CFAA should be limited to intrusions into private
cyberspaces, the Sandvig court initially emphasized a perceived distinction between terms of service
that restrict access to information and terms of service that restrict uses of information. Compare
hiQ Labs, 938 F.3d at 999-1004, with Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 22-27 (D.D.C. 2018).
The Sandvig court later adopted much of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in hiQ when ruling on the
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. See supra notes 100-103.
116. I also set aside my skepticism about the constitutionality of many CFAA decisions. Briefly,
however, I think the First Amendment likely requires the results reached in hiQ and Sandvig because
otherwise the law would restrict access to information that has already been shared with the general
public. See Kadri, supra note 17, at 29-35 (fleshing out this constitutional argument).
117. See, e.g., Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 587-97 (surveying the various interpretations of
"without authorization" offered by scholars and courts); Jonathan Mayer, The "Narrow"
Interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A User Guide for Applying United States v.
Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1644, 1656 & n.60 (2016) (collecting scholarship advocating for a
"code-based" interpretation of "without authorization").
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about trusting them with a gatekeeping role. The CFAA has given them
policymaking power to make decisions affecting competition, innovation,
research, and privacy. This Part explores how platforms have exploited that
deference.
A. Competition Policy: Protecting Data Silos
First off, gatekeeper ights allow platforms to set competition policy by
enforcing their preferred data-access rules. By empowering platforms to
decide who may gather information from websites, cyber-trespass law grants
them a legal right to obstruct data flows arbitrarily, giving them a competitive
advantage that they can abuse. Many platforms entice people to share as
much information as possible on their websites. Even when that information
is posted publicly, platforms can use cyber-trespass law to prevent others
from accessing it. This gatekeeper's privilege can create data silos and add
value to the information-value that the platforms alone can recoup by using
or selling the data.'1 8
Recall that gatekeeper rights are as much about inclusion as exclusion.
To see how that works in practice, consider a recent expos6 about Facebook.
Thanks to a cache of leaked documents, Olivia Solon and Cyrus Farivar
revealed Mark Zuckerberg's plans to consolidate his platform's market
dominance and control its competitors by using some publicly accessible
information about its users "as a bargaining chip."119 The documents showed
how the platform used information from its users' profiles as "leverage" over
other companies.120 Facebook rewarded some partners with access to data
while denying it to rivals.121 For example, Facebook gave Amazon "special
access" when the shopping platform bought Facebook advertising, but it cut
off a rival's access "because it had grown too popular and could compete
118. Gregory Day & Abbey Stemler, Infracompetitive Privacy, 105 IOWA L. REV. 61, 67-78
(2019) (detailing the ways that platforms extract value from data).
119. Olivia Solon & Cyrus Farivar, Leaked Documents Show Facebook Leveraged User Data
to Fight Rivals and Help Friends, NBC (Nov. 6,2019,9:14 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news
/all/leaked-documents-show-facebook-leveraged-user-data-fight-rivals-help-n1076986 [https://
perma.cc/2FEQ-S8XL]; see also Elizabeth Dwoskin, Craig Timberg & Tony Romm, Facebook
Allegedly Offered Advertisers Special Access to Users' Data and Activities, According to
Documents Released by British Lawmakers, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/05/facebook-allegedly-offered-advertisers-special-
access-users-data-activities-according-documents-released-by-british-lawmakers [https://perma.cc
/5Y4Y-XWAC] ("A trove of emails and internal documents ... illustrate how Facebook rose to
dominance years ago by using people's data as a bargaining chip, undermining the social media
giant's claim that changes to its business practices were motivated by a desire to protect people's
privacy."). Not all of the information would have been open to the public, but a lot of valuable data
is easily accessible on Facebook's websites.




with Facebook."122 Internal communications revealed Facebook's plans to
publicly frame this strategy as necessary to protect people's privacy,123
leading Ashkan Soltani, former Chief Technologist at the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), to comment that the evidence showed both how
"disingenuous the company is, and how anti-competitive some of [its]
practices are."124
Platforms can also use the CFAA to sink other companies' competing
services, as appears to have been LinkedIn's goal in blocking hiQ's access to
its website. LinkedIn's Chief Executive Officer candidly admitted that his
platform hoped to "leverage all this extraordinary data we've been able to
collect by virtue of having 500 million people join the site." 25 After hiQ
presented details of its data analytics to Linkedln's employees at a
conference, LinkedIn began developing strikingly similar services before
ultimately blocking hiQ's access.126 As the hiQ court concluded, there was
"ample" evidence that Linkedln's actions threatened hiQ's survival and left
hiQ "no viable way to remain in business."127 Although the preliminary
injunction against LinkedIn has kept hiQ afloat, competitors in other
jurisdictions might not be so lucky.
This ability to create legally enforceable data silos affects consumers as
well as competitors. Platforms may use and have used their gatekeeper ights
to restrict the flow of market data. Most commonly, this occurs when
platforms obstruct third parties' access to pricing or product information.
"Counterintuitively in the information age," Rory Van Loo notes,
"businesses can block access to market information that exists openly on the
web, such as Amazon's or airlines' prices."128
In Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc.,129 for instance, a travel
company was hauled into court for collecting information about flight times
and fares from an airline's website.3 0 The court endorsed the airline's CFAA
claim because the airline had given the travel company "repeated warnings
and requests to stop scraping" and "directly informed" the company that it
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Dwoskin et al., supra note 119.
125. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2019).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 993-94.
128. Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 76, at 837; see also James Grimmelmann,
The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1, 25 (2007) (noting that courts have held
that any use of a server that a business does not condone "is ipso facto unauthorized"); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53
VAND. L. REv. 1965, 1991-92 (2000) (explaining that businesses may claim a CFAA violation even
without taking steps to conceal online product and pricing information).
129. 318 F. Supp. 2d 435 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
130. Id. at 437.
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didn't consent to this practice.31 Similarly, in EF Cultural Travel BVv. Zefer
Corp., 132 competing student travel companies squared off after one gathered
pricing information from the other's publicly accessible website.133 The court
explained that this form of data collection could be prevented based merely
on an "explicit statement" on the website that it was forbidden.13 1
These uses of gatekeeper ights effectively establish competition policy
through what Van Loo has called "data obstruction," whereby companies use
law to "freeze the flow of readily available data" and halt services that could
offer consumers lower prices and better product information.135 There have
been moves, for instance, to block price-comparison tools that help patients
find cheaper prescription drugs and aggregation services that let travelers
view all of their loyalty-program perks in one place.136 Airlines have even
thwarted cunning attempts by companies to get better seats for passengers.137
My aim isn't to show that platforms always use their gatekeeper ights
to set bad competition policy. The point is that cyber-trespass law gives them
unchecked discretion to set the rules governing data access by competitors
and consumers, even on publicly accessible websites. Still, it's worth noting
why we might be wary to trust them with this gatekeeper ole. For one thing,
legally sanctioned data obstruction conflicts with established consensus in
law and economics that "good legal interventions should generally remove
market information asymmetries, not create them."33 As we've seen, cyber-
trespass law allows platforms to create a range of information asymmetries,
selectively choosing who may gather information from their websites, when
and how they may do so, and for what reasons. They may turn the tap on and
off whenever they please.
131. Id. at 439-40.
132. 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cit. 2003).
133. Id. at 60.
134. Id. at 62.
135. Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 76, at 837-38, 872.
136. Van Loo, Rise ofthe Digital Regulator, supra note 21, at 1286; Ron Lieber, Swatting Down
Start-Ups that Help Consumers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
2012/04/07/your-money/swatting-down-start-ups-with-consumer-friendly-ideas.html [https://
perma.cc/TT7M-CV7F].
137. Ron Lieber & Susan Warren, Southwest Makes It Harder to Jump the Line, WALL ST. J.
(June 7, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114964168631673304 [https://perma
.cc/U6ML-N27C] (discussing Southwest Airlines' attempts to prevent companies from checking in
passengers as soon as check-in opens to secure better seats); see also Lieber, supra note 136
(describing potential lawsuits that airlines could bring against a company that accesses passengers'
reservations to find better seats that open up after they make their initial booking).
138. Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 76, at 872; see also Alan Schwartz &
Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 631 (1979) (asserting that regulation might be
warranted when "imperfect information has produced noncompetitive prices and terms").
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For another, although the economics of data flows are beyond the scope
of my project, it's worth noting some empirical evidence supporting the
notion that greater data legibility benefits consumers. After Israel passed a
law requiring brick-and-mortar grocery stores to share digitized pricing
information, consumers profited.139 A recent study of the law's effects
showed not only that prices decreased by around 5%, but also that prices
declined as more shoppers used price-comparison websites fueled by the new
data.40 Beyond this study, ample anecdotal evidence suggests that consumers
can benefit from greater pricing transparency online. Take the example of
Autoslash, a start-up that reportedly saved customers around 25% on rental
cars by monitoring online prices and alerting people when to rent.
141 The
major rental agencies didn't take kindly to this practice, and one by one they
sought to block their cars from being shown on Autoslash.1
42 Even though all
of the relevant information was freely available online, the start-up couldn't
risk continuing without the agencies' approval-and consumers paid the
price.14 3
B. Innovation Policy: Controlling Complementary Services
Platforms may also use their gatekeeper ights to set innovation policy
by deciding which complementary services will sink or swim. This might
strike some computer scientists as odd given that the technical meaning of a
"platform" suggests an innate openness to complementarity. As Tarleton
Gillespie has explained, the "computational meaning" of a platform is "a
programmable infrastructure upon which other software can be built and run"
or "information services that allow developers to design additional layers of
functionality.""4 Despite the term's technical connotation, cyber-trespass
law contributes to the legal reality that platforms needn't embrace outside
collaboration.
The pick-and-choose approach lets individual platforms dictate
innovation policy, empowering them to grant or withhold permission for
complementary services unilaterally. This legal regime prevents "adversarial
interoperability," a phrase popularized by Cory Doctorow to refer to a new
139. Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 76, at 872-73.
140. Itai Ater & Oren Rigbi, The Effects of Mandatory Disclosure of Supermarket Prices 27
(CESifo Working Paper No. 6942, 2018), https://ssm.com/abstract=3046703.
141. Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 76, at 837; Van Loo, Rise of the Digital
Regulator, supra note 21, at 1286; Ron Lieber, A Rate Sleuth Making Rental Car Companies
Squirm, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/your-money/autoslash-
a-rate-sleuth-makes-rental-car-companies-squirm-your-money.html [https://perma.cc/QQ9L-
RAET].
142. Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 76, at 837.
143. Id.
144. GILLESPIE, supra note 3, at 19; see also Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of 'Platforms,' 12
NEW MEDIA & SOC'Y 347, 349-50 (2010) (presenting divergent meanings of "platform").
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service that "plugs into the existing ones without the permission of the
companies that make them."145 Doctorow observes that adversarial
interoperability "was once the driver of tech's dynamic marketplace, where
the biggest firms could go from top of the heap to scrap metal in an eyeblink,
where tiny startups could topple dominant companies before they even knew
what hit them."14 6 It helped keep incumbents on their toes, knowing that they
had to innovate in order to maintain their success.
Nowadays, however, adversarial interoperability is rare and risky. A
handful of platforms have achieved market dominance and have used laws
like the CFAA to quash inventive add-ons to their services.147 Consider
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.148 In 2008, when Facebook had
around 150 million users,14 9 a start-up called Power Ventures created a
service to let people use multiple social networks within a single interface.15 0
To make this service work, the start-up asked for people's permission to
gather information from their various profiles.'5 ' Even though Facebook's
users voluntarily provided access to their accounts, Facebook's lawyers sent
a letter demanding that Power Ventures stop accessing Facebook's
website.52 When it persisted, Facebook sued under the CFAA and won
145. Cory Doctorow, Adversarial Interoperability, BOING BOING (Oct. 2, 2019, 5:07 PM),
https://boingboing.net/2019/10/02/plug-and-play.html [https://perma.cc/QY9Z-5CJC]; see also
Mike Masnick, There Are Lots of Ways to Punish Big Tech Companies, but Only a Few Will Actually
Help Improve the Internet, TECHDIRT (June 14, 2019, 9:27 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20190613/02225942388/there-are-lots-ways-to-punish-big-tech-companies-only-few-will-
actually-help-improve-intemet.shtml [https://perma.cc/P8VY-YY5A] (discussing Doctorow's
argument and concluding that "making platforms more open-forcing 'interoperability'-is
certainly one way forward" to help make the internet "more dynamic and competitive"); Chris Riley,
Using Interoperability for Horizontal Competition and Data Portability, MEDIUM (May 24,
2018), https://medium.com/@mchrisriley/using-interoperability-for-horizontal-competition-and-
data-portability-6706906ce699 [https://perma.cc/GM5Z-2NSW] (discussing the competitive
benefits of data portability and interoperability); cf Josh Constine, Friend Portability Is the Must-
Have Facebook Regulation, TECHCRUNCH (May 12, 2019, 12:35 PM), https://techcrunch.com/
2019/05/12/friends-wherever [https://perma.cc/FDA3-JFD4] (arguing that the Federal Trade
Commission "must require Facebook to offer truly interoperable data portability for the social
graph" by passing regulations "forcing Facebook to let you export your friend list to other social
networks in a privacy-safe way").
146. Doctorow, supra note 145.
147. Mark A. Lemley, The Splinternet, 70 DUKE L.J. 1297, 1324-25 (2021) (discussing how
the CFAA and copyright law have thwarted interoperability and preserved incumbent platforms'
dominance).
148. 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016).
149. Ami Sedghi, Facebook: 10 Years of Social Networking, in Numbers, GUARDIAN (Feb. 4,
2014, 9:38 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/feb/04/facebook-in-numbers-
statistics [https://perma.cc/7TYE-FU94].
150. Facebook, 844 F.3d at 1062.
151. Id. at 1067.
152. Id. at 1063; see also Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 n.8 (N.D. Cal.
2013) (noting that Power Ventures had gathered the information from Facebook "with the consent
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simply because the start-up had received "written notification from
Facebook" that its complementary service was forbidden.153 Eleven years on,
Facebook now has over two billion users and Power Ventures has none.
154
At first blush, Power Ventures' multiplatform interface might not appear
particularly innovative. After all, it was merely providing a convenient way
for people to access existing platforms without seeking to improve or
displace them. But that needn't be the case. Take Gobo, an experiment
spearheaded by media scholar Ethan Zuckerman. Gobo also offers a multi-
platform interface, but its mantra-"Your social media. Your Rules."-
animates its four main features in ways that are not only creative but also
political.' First, Gobo allows you to connect multiple platforms, gathering
your feeds in one place.156 Second, Gobo lets you set rules to control your
feeds, replacing the inscrutable algorithms built by existing platforms to
curate what you see.' Third, Gobo reveals what gets hidden on your feeds,
helping you understand how and why your rules affect your information
diet.158 And fourth, Gobo resists echo chambers, permitting you to solicit
unfamiliar perspectives in your feeds.'59 As Zuckerman explains, Gobo puts
power back in people's hands:
Want more posts from women? Adjust a slider to set the gender
balance of your feed .. . or just click on the "mute all men" button and
listen to the folks who often get shouted down in online dialogs. Want
to broaden the perspectives in your feed? Move the politics slider from
"my perspective" to "lots of perspectives" and Gobo introduces news
stories from sources you might not otherwise find.160
of users who shared their credentials" (citing Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp.
2d 1025, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2012))).
153. Facebook, 844 F.3d at 1068; see also id. at 1067 (holding that access to a website becomes
unauthorized once "permission has been revoked explicitly").
154. See Kurt Wilberding & Georgia Wells, Facebook's Timeline: 15 Years In, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 4, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-timeline-15-years-in-
11549276201 [https://perma.cc/J4VA-SANG] (reporting that Facebook, as of December 2019, had
over two billion users).





160. Ethan Zuckerman, Who Filters Your News? Why We Built Gobo.Social (Nov. 16,
2017), https://ethanzuckerman.com/2017/11/16/who-filters-your-news-why-we-built-gobo-social/
[https://perma.cc/2BZM-8AS2]; see also Rachel Metz, Social Networks Are Broken. This Man
Wants to Fix Them, MIT TECH. REv. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/
s/610152/social-networks-are-broken-this-man-wants-to-fix-them [https://perma.cc/78GA-HX9R]
("[R]ather than making [Gobo's algorithms] a top-secret black box, we made it an open box where
you can reach in and set the sliders and experiment and say, 'Oh, I like how this works. Now let me
change it this way and see if it works better for me."' (quoting Zuckerman)).
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Gobo might seem too good to be true. And in today's legal landscape, it
might well be. Facebook has limited Gobo's ability to attract users by
allowing access to only a limited set of posts from public pages-access it
could revoke at any time.161 Under many prevailing CFAA precedents,
platforms can stop initiatives like Gobo in their tracks with a single letter
from their lawyers.162
It's true that complementary services like those offered by Power
Ventures don't rest purely on accessing information that's accessible to the
general public. Some features relied on users sharing access credentials,
enabling an outsider to gather information from their personal feeds or
profiles. In that sense, the technical access in Facebook v. Power Ventures
seems different to that sought by, for example, the start-up in hiQ v. Linkedln
that wanted to scrape public websites.63 But the thread binding these
activities together is the role cyber-trespass law plays in creating legally
enforceable gatekeeper rights. In both scenarios, outsiders had the technical
ability to access information from websites-in hiQ because the profiles were
open to the general public, in Facebook because users provided login details
to reveal their feeds. And in both scenarios, platforms took legal action to
prevent the outsiders' access by exercising their gatekeeper rights on the
basis of cease-and-desist letters. Facebook succeeded where LinkedIn failed
because of how the court interpreted the statute, but the underlying logic was
the same: platforms were invoking cyber-trespass law to set innovation
policy by legal means, not merely technical measures.
C. Research Policy: Curating External Oversight
Gatekeeper rights also allow platforms to curate external oversight by
setting policies that govern outside researchers. As Facebook's former chief
security officer Alex Stamos and others have warned, the CFAA's consent-
based regime empowers platforms to block and chill all sorts of research that
relies on information gathered from websites." Amy Kapczynski,
161. Zuckerman, supra note 160.
162. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067-68 (holding that
disregard of a cease-and-desist letter and continued access of a platform's website supports CFAA
liability); see also Mitch Stoltz & Andrew Crocker, Once Again, Facebook Is Using Privacy as a
Sword to Kill Independent Innovation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www
.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/11 /once-again-facebook-using-privacy-sword-kill-independent-innovation
[https://perma.cc/MU7E-JJG6] (reporting on the latest example of Facebook's "legal bullying" by
invoking the CFAA "to shut down apps that give users more control over their own social media
experience").
163. See supra subpart 1(B).
164. Letter from Alex Stamos et al. to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees (Aug. 1,
2013), https://www.eff.org/document/letter-def-con-cfaa-reform [https://perma.cc/K63P-58G4]
("[T]he CFAA currently threatens and chills valuable research in the field by reaching mere
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meanwhile, has protested that platforms can pair the CFAA with boilerplate
contracts and terms of service to "forbid users from undertaking research that
might disclose aspects of their platform's functioning."165 This kind of
independent scrutiny is crucial in the digital age.166
Consider the report by journalists Julia Angwin and Surya Mattu, who
analyzed Amazon search results to show the e-commerce giant prioritizing
its own products while concealing cheaper deals offered by competitors.167
Or the research of data analyst Jonathan Albright, who studied Facebook
activity to reveal that the 2016 Russian disinformation campaign was worse
violations of terms of use and other acts, such as security research, which cause no real harm and
indeed make the public safer."); see also Bambauer, supra note 78, at 958 ("The CFAA, therefore,
dangles significant risk of punishment over researchers who would like to test online services for
evidence of racial bias or who would like to scrape publicly displayed information in order to put it
in a more usable form for sociological research."); Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164 U.
PA. L. REv. 1453, 1467, 1502 (2016) ("[C]ybercrime liability is, in fact, backfiring: by chilling vital
research, cybercrime law actually reduces computer security.... Prosecutors rarely charge ordinary
consumers, journalists, or security researchers under cybercrime law-yet there is a widely
perceived legal risk for those communities."); D. Victoria Baranetsky, Data Journalism and the
Law, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow center reports/data-
journalism-and-the-law.php [https://perma.cc/69FJ-5VA3] (stating that there is evidence of stories
having been "hindered or held from publication for the threat of penalty," including several reporters
on record "describing stories that have been blocked because of legal concerns associated with the
CFAA," such that it is clear that "the CFAA presents real obstacles to reporting a variety of
important stories in the public interest"); Columbia Journalism School, Data Journalism and the
Law, YOUTUBE (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWKgh70DYec&feature
-=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/HK7A-RUGE] (discussing how the CFAA has discouraged and
prevented journalists and academics from researching platforms); Cory Doctorow, Cory Doctorow:
Disruption for Thee, But Not for Me, LOCUS (Jan. 7, 2019), http://locusmag.com/2019/0l/cory-
doctorow-disruption-for-thee-but-not-for-me/ [https://perma.cc/6X89-L7N4] ("CFAA is used to
threaten, intimidate, sue, and even jail people engaged in otherwise perfectly lawful activity, merely
because they have violated some term of service on the way."); JOSEPH LORENZO HALL & STAN
ADAMS, TAKING THE PULSE OF HACKING: A RISK BASIS FOR SECURITY RESEARCH 9 (Mar. 2018),
https://cdt.org/files/2018/04/2018-03-27-Risk-Basis-for-Security-Research-FNL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZVQ4-3WND] (presenting empirical evidence of how security researchers avoid certain
types of research for fear that they will violate the CFAA).
165. See Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460, 1502-
03 (2020) (observing that platform-written contracts are "dramatically amplified by overbroad
laws" like the CFAA).
166. See Sheera Frenkel, She Warned of 'Peer-to-Peer Misinformation.' Congress Listened,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/technology/social-media-
disinformation.html [https://perma.cc/5SFK-UJSG] (discussing how the "small group of self-made
experts" who had gathered and analyzed information on platforms to advise Congress on
disinformation campaigns "is a testament o just how long tech companies have failed to find a
solution to the problem").
167. Julia Angwin & Surya Mattu, Amazon Says It Puts Customers First. But Its Pricing





than the platform had admitted.168 Or the experiments by computer scientists
Camila Souza Aranjo, Wagner Meira Jr., and Virgilio Almeida, who
uncovered Google's algorithmic racism in disproportionately showing white
women in searches for "beautiful woman" and black women in searches for
"ugly woman."169 Or the analysis by Harvard Business School academics,
who examined Airbnb interactions to find that guests with distinctively
African American names were 16% less likely to be accepted relative to
identical guests with distinctively white names.17 0 Or the study by Abby
Whitmarsh, who exposed the gendered dynamics of image-based sexual
abuse by finding that 378 out of 396 posts on a self-styled "revenge
pornography" website depicted women while only 18 depicted men.17 1
All five of these research projects relied on scraping information from
publicly accessible websites. All five uncovered salient online activity. And
all five posed reputational threats or prompted unwanted attention, as this
kind of adversarial research often does.172 No surprise, then, that platforms
168. Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Takes Down Data and Thousands of
Posts, Obscuring Reach of Russian Disinformation, WASH. PosT (Oct. 12, 2017, 10:42 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/12/facebook-takes-down-data-and
-thousands-of-posts-obscuring-reach-of-russian-disinformation [https://perma.cc/4QJ6-EB6W];
see also Rob Barry, Russian Trolls Tweeted Disinformation Long Before U.S. Election, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 20, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/graphics/russian-trolls-tweeted-disinformation-
long-before-u-s-election [https://perma.cc/9ZV2-CGS8] (presenting a new picture of the Russian
disinformation campaign based on analysis of over 200,000 tweets).
169. Camila Souza Aranjo, Wagner Meira Jr. & Virgilio Almeida, Identifying Stereotypes in
the Online Perception of Physical Attractiveness, in 1 SOCIAL INFORMATICS 419, 420-21 (Emma
Spiro & Yong-Yeol Ahn eds., 2016); see also Caitlin Dewey, Study: Image Results for the Google
Search 'Ugly Woman' Are Disproportionately Black, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2016, 12:36 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/08/10/study-image-results-for-the-
google-search-ugly-woman-are-disproportionately-black [https://perma.cc/6MBX-CQQC]
(describing Aranjo, Meira, and Almeida's study). For foundational work on algorithmic
discrimination and oppression, see NOBLE, supra note 27; Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in
Online Ad Delivery, ACM QUEUE, Mar. 2013, at 1, 1.
170. Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J., Apr. 2017, at 1, 1, 7.
171. Abby Whitmarsh, Analysis of 28 Days of Data Scraped from a Revenge Pornography
Website, EVERLASTING STUDENT (Apr. 13, 2015), https://everlastingstudent.wordpress.com/
2015/04/13/analysis-of-28-days-of-data-scraped-from-a-revenge-pornography-website [https://
perma.cc/8K2Q-S8Q8].
172. This unwanted attention, beyond creating bad PR, can also have legal consequences. For
example, a 2016 ProPublica investigation into Facebook's advertising practices appeared to provoke
a 2019 housing-discrimination lawsuit against the platform by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. See Julia Angwin & Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users
by Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-
advertisers-exclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/NSC6-AW2Z] (revealing how "Facebook's
system allows advertisers to exclude black, Hispanic, and other 'ethnic affinities' from seeing ads");
Ariana Tobin, HUD Sues Facebook over Housing Discrimination and Says the Company's




have threatened legal action when researchers have failed to get advance
permission before collecting information from their websites.17 3 Cyber-
trespass law gives weight to these legal threats and allows platforms to curate
the kind of external oversight they receive.
This legal landscape has also encouraged platforms to develop radically
different approaches to managing their relationships with outside researchers.
Despite the major platforms' uniform policies against scraping,7 4 they've
selectively waived certain restrictions when it suits them. Twitter, for
example, sells data access to those willing to pay.175 Facebook, meanwhile,
cherry-picks particular researchers by entering into data-sharing partnerships
that permit a handful of lucky outsiders to study information on its website. " 6
perma.cc/96HQ-STL4] (reporting on the government's claim that Facebook violated the Fair
Housing Act "by allowing advertisers to limit housing ads based on race, gender and other
characteristics").
173. See supra note 164; see also Horwitz, supra note 10 (discussing Facebook's legal threats
against New York University researchers studying political advertising); Pete Warden, How to Split
Up the US, PETE WARDEN'S BLOG (Feb. 6, 2010), https://petewarden.com/2010/02/06/how-to-
split-up-the-us [https://perma.cc/X6M2-V7KC] (presenting research about social networks based
on data gathered from 210 million public Facebook profiles using crawling); Pete Warden, How I
Got Sued by Facebook, PETE WARDEN'S BLOG (Apr. 5, 2010), https://petewarden.com/2010/04/05
/how-i-got-sued-by-facebook [https://perma.cc/4TU3-76P4] (telling researcher's story of
Facebook's threat to sue him for failing to "obtain prior written permission" to conduct the study
and Facebook's demand that he delete the data set).
174. See, e.g., Automated Data Collection Terms, FACEBOOK (Apr. 15, 2010), https://
www.facebook.com/apps/site-scraping-tosterms.php [ ttps://perma.cc/4X5A-9Z5G] ("You will
not engage in Automated Data Collection without Facebook's express written permission."); Twitter
Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos [https://perma.cc/4BBZ-2UFR] ("[S]craping
the Services without the prior consent of Twitter is expressly prohibited."); API Terms of Use,
LINKEDIN, https://legal.linkedin.com/api-terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/QL6V-2MGH] ("You
must not:.. . Scrape Content from the Services" or "[a]ccess, store, display, or facilitate the transfer
of any Linkedln content obtained through the following methods: scraping, crawling, spidering or
using any other technology or software to access Linkedln content outside the APIs."). Facebook
recently celebrated the many legal actions it has taken under the CFAA to prevent scraping,
highlighting the platform's "coordinated legal strategy across jurisdictions to enforce its Terms and
protect its users" in at least five separate cases in the past two years. See Jessica Romero, Taking
Legal Action Against Data Scraping, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 1, 2020), https://about.fb.com
/news/2020/10/taking-legal-action-against-data-scraping [https://perma.cc/D4TB-7HV3].
175. Twitter API, TWITTER, https://developer.twitter.com/en/pricing.html [https://perma.cc/
52XV-6ZA7]; see also Mylynn Felt, Social Media and the Social Sciences: How Researchers
Employ Big Data Analytics, BIG DATA & SoC'Y, Apr. 29, 2016, at 1, 1 (discussing use of Twitter
application for "data mining and analysis").
176. Columbia Journalism School, supra note 164 (Alex Abdo, at 1:12:06, noting that Facebook
wants researchers to go through "approved channels of access" before doing any research); Gary
King & Nathaniel Persily, A New Model for Industry-Academic Partnerships, 53 POL. SCI. & POL.
703, 703 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096519001021 [https://perma.cc/PHL3-AL38]
(proposing a "model for industry-academic partnerships" that the authors adopted to partner with
Facebook to get access to data). But see Craig Silverman, Facebook Said It Would Give Detailed
Data to Academics. They're Still Waiting, BUzzFEED (Aug. 22, 2019, 9:30 PM), https://www
.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/slow-facebook [https://perma.cc/EMU4-5G74] (noting




Although some access might seem better than no access, it's troubling that
platforms get to choose their own overseers.177 Biases within the platforms
might impede oversight from diverse groups, and platforms might favor those
who conduct complimentary research over those who don't.7 8 This situation,
in turn, creates risks that researchers will tailor their work to protect their
access to these platforms, compromising the integrity of their findings.179
Perceptions of partiality-justified or not-leave researchers vulnerable to
accusations that they're complicit in corporate propaganda.
The point isn't that researchers must be given free rein. Rather, it's that
cyber-trespass law has allowed platforms to set the research agenda. The
result is an atmosphere of intense distrust. As Mike Ananny and Emily Bell
have complained, researchers must now go to the platforms and "stand in line
for "dollops of data."180 It's only natural to worry about the impartiality of
non-adversarial research, either because the platforms might selectively
disclose information or because the researchers have an incentive to stay in
the platforms' good books. Worse still are the platforms' own claims about
what's working and what isn't. "At the moment, they're marking their own
homework," says Claire Wardle.8 ' She warns that the platforms "like to tell
us that the interventions they're rolling out are working, but because they
write their own transparency reports, there's no way for us to independently
verify what's actually happening."8 2 Although Wardle acknowledges that
"these companies have to play a really important role in this process," she
177. See Persily & Tucker, supra note 24, at 324 (raising concerns about "for-profit companies
playing the role of gatekeeper, where the assumption would be that research making the company
look bad would be more likely to be withheld").
178. See Yeshimabeit Milner (Yeshi), An Open Letter to Facebook from the Data for Black
Lives Movement, MEDIUM (Apr. 4, 2018), https://medium.com/@YESHICAN/an-open-letter-to-
facebook-from-the-data-for-black-lives-movement-81e693c6b46c [https://perma.cc/KT4Q-HCQ4]
(proposing the "Data for Black Lives" and "Public Data Trust" initiatives to encourage Facebook
to permit research from diverse researchers).
179. See Luigi Zingales, Uber and the Sherlock Holmes Principle: How Control of Data Can
Lead to Biased Academic Research, PROMARKET (Oct. 9, 2019), https://promarket.org/uber-and-
the-sherlock-holmes-principle-how-control-of-data-can-lead-to-biased-academic-research [https://
perma.cc/MML7-XA36] ("Companies control their data. They tend to share that data with
researchers who use it only in ways that are blessed by the corporations. Thus, important questions
aren't answerable, or worse, the apparent answers might be biased or incomplete.").
180. See Ethan Zuckerman (@EthanZ), TWITTER (Nov. 14,2019,6:48 PM), https://twitter.com
/EthanZ/status/1195141501786963971 [https://perma.cc/EU8N-RC7D] (quoting Emily Bell
(@emilybell), TWITTER (Nov. 14, 2019, 7:50 PM), https://twitter.com/emilybell/status
/1195142075119001601?s=20 [https://perma.cc/J5VC-QY6Z]) (noting her adoption of the "dollops
of data" metaphor from Mike Ananny).
181. Claire Wardle, How You Can Help Transform the Internet into a Place of Trust, TED





correctly observes that "they can't control it" if oversight is to be
meaningful.183
Platforms like Facebook don't seem shy about their selectivity. On the
Facebook Research website, the platform proudly asserts its internal research
teams "collaborate broadly with the academic community."1 84 But there's a
telling caveat about which collaborations the platform will pursue. In
Facebook's own words, all proposals to conduct external research should
"align with our mission of building community and bringing the world closer
together."185 Even if this capacious language could cover all sorts of studies,
it's significant that Facebook admits that external projects must "align" with
its own interests.
As I've argued elsewhere, Facebook's prior mission statement
"Making the world more open and connected"-was "a normatively
questionable maxim" because the "benefits of greater openness and
connection are contestable."8 6 While it might seem trivial to quibble with
Facebook's slogans, it matters if external research gets sidelined for
contesting contestable mantras. Yet the platform's gatekeeper rights give it
that preclearance power.187 Armed with the CFAA, platforms can deter
researchers from gathering information from their publicly accessible
websites, and some have even stopped users from sharing information from
their own feeds with researchers.'88 As gatekeepers, it's their legal right to
enforce whatever policies they wish.
183. Id. Even Facebook concedes that "[n]o company should grade its own homework."
Vishwanath Sarang, Independent Audit of Community Standards Enforcement Report Metrics,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 11, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/08/independent-audit-of-
enforcement-report-metrics [https://perma.cc/W8AF-5Y23]. In the face of sustained criticism and
pressure, the platform has pledged to allow some independent oversight over narrow slices of its
operations, including an external audit planned for 2021 to assess the metrics it uses to judge
enforcement of its content policies. Id. Although initiatives like these give researchers a glimpse
behind the curtain, the nature and extent of oversight remain at the platform's whim.
184. Research Areas, FACEBOOK RES., https://research.fb.com/research-areas [https://perma
.cc/GTN2-9XRV].
185. Research Awards, FACEBOOK RES., https://research.fb.com/research-awards [https://
perma.cc/4WXT-VJ2W].
186. Kadri, supra note 19, at 1091-92.
187. Facebook adopts a similar preclearance policy for qualitative empirical work about the
platform. Academics conducting interviews with Facebook employees must agree to "ask Facebook
first" before using any quotes in their research. While some academics agree to give the platform
review, revision, and veto powers over their work before it's published, others simply refuse to do
interviews or use any quotes. I've taken the latter approach as a matter of academic integrity. To
me, it's important for my readers to know that nobody at Facebook ever has the chance to sanitize
or curate their words before they appear in my work.
188. See Jeremy B. Merrill & Ariana Tobin, Facebook Moves to Block Ad Transparency
Tools-Including Ours, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 28, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article
/facebook-blocks-ad-transparency-tools [https://perma.cc/66L2-JK4F] (discussing Facebook's
decision to block a crowdsourcing tool that allowed users to share information about the political
ads on their feeds with journalists at ProPublica).
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D. Privacy Policy: Granting Internal Immunity
Lastly, gatekeeper rights allow platforms to set privacy policies that,
unsurprisingly, they don't enforce against themselves. Because the United
States lacks federal legislation regulating the collection and use of data,
platforms are left to make policy decisions about who may gather data and
what they may do with it. Although we can't blame platforms entirely for this
legislative lethargy,189 the result is that cyber-trespass law has become a key
legal instrument in setting and enforcing data-privacy rules. Even if we
assume that platforms use their power to establish good privacy policies for
others, one thing is clear: platforms are immune from their own rules.
Take Linkedln's position in hiQ, in which the platform argued that
allowing scraping on its website "threatens its members' privacy."190
LinkedIn was itself offering third-party access to the very same information
that hiQ sought from public profiles-but for a price. LinkedIn allowed
recruiters to track particular users and receive alerts when those users made
changes to their profiles.19' The platform also permitted certain third parties
to export data from its users' profiles, including their names, employers, and
locations.192 The CFAA's structure authorized Linkedln to take such
contradictory positions. The platform could sell its users' information to
clients while still seeking to enforce a privacy policy that forbade hiQ's
access to that same information.
189. Although their lobbying likely hasn't helped. See Carole Cadwalladr & Duncan Campbell,
Revealed: Facebook's Global Lobbying Against Data Privacy Laws, GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2019,
9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/02/facebook-global-lobbying-
campaign-against-data-privacy-laws-investment [ht ps://perma.cc/7WDB-HARC] (reporting that a
leak of internal Facebook documents revealed that "Facebook has targeted politicians around the
world ... promising investments and incentives while seeking to pressure them into lobbying on
Facebook's behalf against data privacy legislation"); Lee Fang, Silicon Valley-Funded Privacy
Think Tanks Fight in D.C. to Unravel State-Level Consumer Privacy Protections, INTERCEPT
(Apr. 16, 2019, 7:39 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/04/16/consumer-privacy-laws-california
[https://perma.cc/H2F2-NDVT] (observing that industry-funded think tanks that have "positioned
themselves as expert voices on consumer privacy" were working to "push[] legislation in a direction
that would have weak enforcement mechanisms, give consumers limited means for recourse, and
. . . roll back state-level privacy standards being enacted by state legislatures"); Cecilia Kang, Tech
Industry Pursues a Federal Privacy Law, on Its Own Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/08/26/technology/tech-industry-federal-privacy-law.html [https://perma
.cc/36GS-AWPS] (discussing lobbying efforts by several Big Tech companies to encourage the
enactment of federal data privacy laws that would be beneficial for those companies); Kartikay
Mehrotra, Laura Mahoney & Daniel Stoller, Google and Other Tech Firms Seek to Weaken
Landmark California Data-Privacy Law, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2019, 2:32 PM), https://
www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-09-04/google-and-other-tech-companies-attempt-to-water-
down-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/74GD-UXPH] (discussing a Google lobbyist's attempt to
amend a proposed California law that would limit platforms' ability to monetize user data).
190. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2019).
191. Id. at 994-95.
192. Id. at 995.
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The CFAA is a poor fit for contemporary privacy interests because the
law fails to protect people from the platforms they use. People rely on
platforms to engage in all sorts of online activities, from socializing to
shopping to networking. These activities leave digital breadcrumbs for
platforms to follow.1 93 Platforms usually use these breadcrumbs to feed their
ad-based business models, but they might also use them to decide what
speech you'll see, what prices you'll be offered, or what jobs you'll
discover.19' They could even use them to manipulate your voting behavior on
election day.195 Such practices might strike people as fraudulent and abusive,
at least in a colloquial sense. But, somewhat ironically, the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act does nothing to prevent them. Under the CFAA, platforms are
free to "consent" to collecting and using information stored on their own
servers.
This dynamic could partially explain why no CFAA charges were
brought in a recent cyber-espionage case involving Twitter. Federal
prosecutors charged two former Twitter employees with acting as agents for
Saudi Arabia, accusing the pair of helping the Saudi government identify and
target dissidents by accessing their personal details on Twitter's internal
193. See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 89 (2015) ("Today, great chunks of human society are being transformed into digital
form, and we all leave digital footprints every day as we live our lives."); Olga Tokarczuk, Nobel
Laureate in Literature 2018, Nobel Lecture: The Tender Narrator, at 9 (Jennifer Croft & Antonia
Lloyd-Jones trans., Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2019/12/tokarczuk-lecture-
english.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZX8-XYZH] ("[T]he Internet, completely and unreflectively subject
to market processes and dedicated to monopolists, controls gigantic quantities of data used not at
all pansophically, for the broader access to information, but on the contrary, serving above all to
program the behavior of users, as we learned after the Cambridge Analytica affair."); Jack M.
Balkin, Fixing Social Media's Grand Bargain, LAWFARE (Oct. 24, 2018, 12:37 PM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/fixing-social-medias-grand-bargain [https://perma.cc/
GHC7-4HET] ("Digital communication leaves collectible traces of interactions, choices, and
activities."). Balkin goes on to explain that as a result of that communication, "digital companies
can collect, analyze, and develop rich dossiers of data about end users," which "include not only the
information end users voluntarily share with others, but their contacts, friends, time spent on various
pages, links visited, even keystrokes." Id.
194. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 8-18 (2019)
(discussing the threat to human autonomy brought about by the "surveillance capitalism" underlying
the platform economy); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THEY DON'T REPRESENT US 109 (2019) ("The Internet
watches us. Everything we do on the Internet is captured and monetized. Everything we do is data,
and data is gold.").
195. See Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 335-37 (2014)
(discussing the possibility of "digital gerrymandering"); Zoe Corbyn, Facebook Experiment Found
to Boost U.S. Voter Turnout, SCI. AM. (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.scientificamerican
.com/article/facebook-experiment-found-to-boost-us-voter-turnout [https://perma.cc/YDP7-PTLY]




database, including allies of murdered Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.196
Even though the platform's employees accessed information from over
6,000 accounts, neither the government nor the platform has alleged any
CFAA violation.197 Why? We can't know for sure, but one reason might be
that the CFAA's structure would make this a legally precarious move.1 98
Twitter's own employees accessed the dissidents' information, and, as
platform insiders, it's possible that they were "authorized" under the statute
to do so.199 Even if a CFAA claim by Twitter was legally viable, the structural
point remains: platforms like Twitter needn't enforce their own data-privacy
policies against themselves, and their status as gatekeepers would immunize
them if their users tried to bring one themselves.
Beyond the lack of relief available to users under these circumstances,
this legal regime also allows platforms to talk the talk of protecting privacy
without walking the walk. Although there's growing public consciousness
about platforms' self-serving data practices, the "illusion of privacy"
supported by the CFAA might lull inattentive users into assuming that
information they share with platforms won't be collected and used by
others.200 This impression misses the fact that platforms can enforce their
data-privacy policies selectively. Under cyber-trespass law, they have the
power to make the rules and then pardon themselves and their clients.
Simmering under the surface of this Part has been a tale about how
platforms both create and extract value through their services. There's no
doubt that platforms have built technological tools that are beneficial to the
public. At the same time, they've relied on their users-especially
196. Ellen Nakashima & Greg Bensinger, Former Twitter Employees Charged with Spying for
Saudi Arabia by Digging into the Accounts of Kingdom Critics, WASH. POST (Nov. 6,




198. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857-63 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (ruling that an
employer can't use the CFAA to sue an employee merely for using company computers for
"nonbusiness purposes" but noting that other circuits have "interpret[ed] the CFAA broadly to cover
violations of corporate computer use restrictions or violations of a duty of loyalty").
199. See Jody Westby, Twitter Employee Surveillance for Saudi Arabia Raises Questions About
Company's Cybersecurity and Governance, FORBES (Nov. 12,2019, 1:15 PM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/jodywestby/2019/11 / 2/twitter-employee-surveillance-for-saudi-arabia-raises-questions
-about-companys-cybersecurity-and-governance/?sh=37daeb095f1c [https://perma.cc/37Y7-
59QV] (positing that the lack of CFAA charges may have been due to a concern that it would be
difficult to prove that the employees' access was "actually 'unauthorized' under the CFAA").
200. See Jamie Williams, EFF to Court: Accessing Publicly Available Information on the
Internet Is Not a Crime, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2017/12/eff-court-accessing-publicly-available-information-internet-not-crime [https://
perma.cc/X2LF-6WCT] (criticizing Linkedln's contract-based restrictions as capable of deterring
"law-abiding individuals and U.S.-based companies" from accessing user data, "but nothing more").
2021 ] 985
Texas Law Review
information provided by their users-to make their services lucrative. One
way that platforms preserve that value is by restricting access to that
information, as is their prerogative under cyber-trespass law.
But as we've seen, it's a fundamentally political decision about how
policymaking power should be allocated in this arena. Our laws influence the
type of competition that flourishes, the type of innovation that's possible, the
type of research that's available, and the type of privacy that's protected.
Cyber-trespass law abdicates that political decisionmaking to platforms.
These private actors enjoy broad discretion to set the rules governing key
features of digital life, swallowing or stalling other regulatory regimes that
might be less defined by the platforms' own interests and preferences.20 1 That
likely wasn't Congress's goal in expanding cyber-trespass law, but it's still
the legal regime we have today.
Again, I'll stress that my claim isn't that platforms will always use their
gatekeeper ights to make bad policy. Rather, it's that we should cabin the
reach of cyber-trespass law to clear the way for thoughtful, targeted, and
public-oriented regulation to govern these key policy questions. Whenever
the law delegates decisionmaking authority to private actors, we should
critically assess that power allocation. Some delegations will be good, others
will be, let's say, "problematic."202 Instead of reflexively shunning all private
delegations, "we should focus on how to structure these arrangements
effectively and milk their positive potential."203
In this case, the very nature of platforms' data-driven business models
should make us hesitant to give them unchecked gatekeeper powers to set the
internet's accessibility and informational rules. This cynicism is particularly
sound in an environment where a few companies have gained vast market
power, especially as cyber-trespass law permits them to further entrench their
201. See Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320,
357-66 (2004) (analyzing how the CFAA's application to publicly accessible websites disrupts
copyright law and threatens the free flow of information protected by that legal regime); Andrea M.
Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 155, 159 (2013) (exploring how the
CFAA has eroded the traditional boundaries between criminal law and contract law); Doctorow,
supra note 164 (arguing that the CFAA effectively creates the legal offense of "Felony Contempt
of Business-Model"); Eric Goldman, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Is a Failed Experiment,
FORBFs (Mar. 28, 2013, 4:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/28/the-
computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-is-a-failed-experiment [h tps://perma.cc/G55C-GBNZ] (discussing
how "doctrinal overlaps" created by expansive CFAA liability cause convergence between cyber-
trespass and trade-secret law).





data-driven comparative advantages.204 Because of network effects,
economies of scale, and the scope of data collection and analysis at major
platforms, we aren't operating on a clean slate. The law is facially neutral-
all platforms, big and small, enjoy gatekeeper ights-but the reality is that
cyber-trespass law generally rewards already-dominant platforms.
III. Restraining Digital Gatekeepers
Let's take stock of where we are. Cyber-trespass law gives platforms of
all shapes and sizes a significant power: the right to act as a gatekeeper. This
right gives them discretion that they've used to create policies affecting
competition, innovation, research, and privacy. And this legal regime
supplements the substantial deference that platforms already enjoy in other
areas, from content moderation to product design to political advertising to
algorithmic transparency.20s In the United States, at least, we've largely
embraced a laissez-faire approach to platforms, and cyber-trespass law is a
crucial-yet underappreciated part of that story.
Although a causal claim is hard to make, the existence of laws like the
CFAA might interfere with the development of regulation in this area.
Because the statute's structure and effect has given platforms the power to
develop and enforce their own policy agendas, there's perhaps a sense that
further regulation isn't needed because rules already exist. The time has come
to disrupt that impression. At the very least, we should doubt that platforms
will be public-spirited policymakers on questions of access and data. It's only
natural: their very corporate essence is to maximize their data-driven profits
in self-interested ways. But the law needn't leave them entirely free to do so.
Decisions like hiQ and Sandvig eroded platforms' gatekeeper ights, but
judges alone can't solve the complex problems raised by these cases. If the
decisions are ignored in other circuits, platforms will still enjoy the legal right
to restrict access to publicly accessible websites across jurisdictions. If
204. The CFAA isn't the sole legal regime at play here. Dominant platforms have also used
Europe's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to limit outsiders' access to data. See
generally Michal S. Gal & Oshrit Aviv, The Competitive Effects of the GDPR, 16 J. COMPETITION
L. & EcoN. 349 (2020). The combination of various legal regimes strengthens platforms' powers to
play a gatekeeper role, as does the popular "exit by acquisition" funding model that pushes
innovative tech startups to merge with dominant firms. See Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary,
Exit Strategy, 101 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 8), https://ssm.com/
abstract=3506919 (observing that modern tech companies are "quite literally swallowing up their
competition" due to this now-dominant exit strategy).
205. See, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1349-50 (2018) (exploring how private ownership
of automated technologies has allowed companies to withhold information about their algorithms
under trade-secrets law); Thomas Kadri, How Supreme a Court?, SLATE (Nov. 19, 2018, 1:59 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/l l facebook-zuckerberg-independent-speech-content-appeals-




instead they become the law of the land, the pendulum will swing in the other
direction because everyone will be legally free to gather troves of data from
the internet. And regardless which way those precedential winds blow,
platforms will retain their gatekeeper discretion to block complementary
services that the public desires. We can't rely on the courts to alter these
dynamics. Congress hould intervene.
This Part proposes a tripartite agenda for federal legislators to pursue,
drawing on proposals offered by other scholars and lawmakers. Though each
piece has some independent merit, they address the concerns animating this
Essay only when pursued together. Congress should begin by amending the
CFAA to clarify that it doesn't apply on publicly accessible websites. Next,
Congress should mandate and shield certain forms of interoperability
between platforms. And finally, Congress should pass targeted laws to
regulate the collection and use of publicly accessible information on
websites, plugging a hole created by the first two legislative moves.
These three steps would change the locus of governance in key internet
policy choices, stripping private platforms of the unbounded and trans-
substantive decisionmaking power they currently enjoy over questions
affecting competition, innovation, research, and privacy. It's an ambitious
plan, but we must take bold steps to create a new legal framework fit for the
digital age.
A. Tapering Cyber-Trespass Laws
As an initial step, Congress should amend the CFAA to clarify that the
statute is inapplicable to publicly accessible websites. Although the Supreme
Court might ultimately resolve the doctrinal tensions in this way, a cleaner
path to uniformity would be for Congress to act. The statute's consent-based
trigger made more sense at the CFAA's adoption over thirty years ago, when
only 2,000 computers were connected to the internet and websites didn't even
exist.206 Granting gatekeeper rights to the tight-knit group that operated
fledgling computer networks was an appropriate way to structure legal
protection for those comparatively closed systems.
Applying cyber-trespass law to publicly accessible websites, by
contrast, clashes with the nature of the modern internet. As we've seen, the
CFAA creates incentives for platforms to act selfishly when enforcing their
policy preferences. It's also difficult to judge the wisdom of their policies
because the CFAA makes external research about platforms legally
206. Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that
the CFAA was passed "well before the development of the modern internet"); Kerr, Norms, supra
note 39, at 1161; Corynne McSherry, Want More Competition in Tech? Get Rid of Outdated





precarious. Despite the platforms' assertions that they're setting the right
rules, academics and journalists struggle to assess them independently. As
Alex Abdo has argued, "we cannot trust Facebook to be the gatekeeper to the
information the public needs about Facebook."207 To make matters worse,
even if we assume that a platform has adopted sound strategies to police
others, the law effectively immunizes that platform within its own domain by
letting it be both the rulemaker and the gatekeeper. This dynamic has become
untenable. Reining in gatekeeper rights is the first step to changing it.
A statutory amendment should make clear that the CFAA doesn't cover
websites that are accessible to the general public-"publicly accessible," for
short. What "publicly accessible" should mean in practice is the subject of
much debate among both judges and scholars. The dominant distinction
embraced by both groups rests on some sort of code-based, technological
barrier that effectively renders a website inaccessible to the general public. 208
Most influentially, Orin Kerr has championed a statutory interpretation of the
CFAA's "without authorization" element that would effectively see the
statute activated only when a website is rendered inaccessible to the general
public by an authentication gate-a form of technical barrier, like a
password, to ensure that only certain people may access a particular
webpage.2 0 9
207. Merrill & Tobin, supra note 188; see also Alex Abdo, Free Speech in Black Boxes, KNIGHT
FIRsT AMENDMENT INST. AT COLUM. UNIV. (Feb. 6, 2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/
free-speech-in-black-boxes [https://perma.cc/V5PA-C7JV] (describing the underappreciated
control platforms have over public discourse); Jameel Jaffer, Digital Journalism and the New Public
Square, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. AT COLUM. UNIV. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://
knightcolumbia.org/content/digital-journalism-and-the-new-public-square [https://perma
.cc/U62Z-HQ6A] ("If our collective understanding of the platforms is limited, it's in large part
because the social media companies have guarded so jealously the information that would help us
understand them."); cf Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1668 (2009) ("[I]t is important to note that sometimes the state
can censor just as effectively through legal forms that are private as it can through ones that are
public.").
208. See Mayer, supra note 117, at 1656 & n.60 (collecting sources and claiming that scholars
have "coalesced around a theory that liability should turn on circumvention of technical
protections"); Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1444-60 (2016) (exploring various
interpretations of the CFAA and recommending a "narrow and 'code-based' understanding of
unauthorized access"). But see Ric Simmons, The Failure of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
Time to Take an Administrative Approach to Regulating Computer Crime, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1703, 1722 (2016) (arguing that Congress should abolish the CFAA's trespass provision entirely
and replace it with agency regulations); Sacharoff, supra note 11, at 641 (recommending that
Congress should "abolish the trespass provision" of the CFAA); Annie Lee, Algorithmic Auditing
and Competition Under the CFAA: The Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and
Authorization, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1307, 1317-18 (2018) (arguing that a code-based trigger
for CFAA would create its own uncertainty and vagueness).
209. Kerr, Norms, supra note 39, at 1147.
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The hiQ and Sandvig courts largely embraced Kerr's proposed statutory
interpretation, but one lingering uncertainty is whether any authentication
gate is sufficient to bring the CFAA into play. The vision of a "two-realm
internet" rests on a distinction between websites that require authentication
and those that don't.210 For Kerr, however, there's a caveat. While he agrees
that authentication is salient, he argues that the CFAA shouldn't kick in if a
particular webpage can be accessed by anyone who signs up for an
account.21' In his view, cyber-trespass law shouldn't apply when someone
obtains information from a password-protected website "that actually grants
access for any username and password combination."212 He bases this
argument on a view that the CFAA should account for the "norms" of cyber-
trespass and that, in this scenario, courts should fashion an exception to the
general "authentication principle" in order to both reflect and encourage
norms of openness on the internet.213
Setting aside the merits of Kerr's statutory argument,214 I agree with his
caveat as a policy matter. The presence of an authentication gate shouldn't
be the be-all and end-all of cyber-trespass liability; it should matter when
practically anyone is allowed to create an account.2 1 s If it didn't, platforms
would remain free to arbitrarily and selectively enforce their access rules
against some people and not others, despite the fact that the information is
already in the public sphere. When I post this Essay on SSRN.com, for
example, nobody should have to worry about facing liability for reading it
even though SSRN now prompts people to log into their password-protected
accounts to view articles. SSRN likely erected this technical step to disrupt
automated downloads of the many articles it hosts on its website, but anybody
who creates an account can access any article. Like Kerr, I'd argue that
nobody should go to jail or face civil liability for obtaining information
accessible by anyone with an internet connection simply because the
company has an anti-scraping preference enforced partly by requiring users
to sign into an account.2"
210. Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F. Supp. 3d 73, 85 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 20-5153 (D.C.
Cir. May 28, 2020).
211. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 15, at 1646.
212. Id.
213. Kerr, Norms, supra note 39, at 1147.
214. See supra note 115.
215. See Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and Privacy, 62 BUS.
LAW. 1395, 1399 (2007) (proposing that courts draw on the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test to limit the CFAA's reach, declaring access to be unauthorized only
when it violates an "objective norm" that "reflect[s] the customs, practices and values of a society").
216. I explore the intricacies of these accessibility questions in greater depth in Kadri, supra
note 17, at 7 (arguing that courts should construe the First Amendment to protect various activities
on "publicly accessible" websites as a constitutional matter). Briefly, I argue that cyber-trespass law
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To recap, Kerr's caveat introduces an exception to his proposed general
rule that cyber-trespass law should apply only on websites behind
authentication gates. As a result, the caveat seems somewhat in tension with
the alternative statutory language he proposed years ago, under which CFAA
liability could apply to people who "circumvent technological access
barriers" to access a website.217 Concerned about he possibility of a
capacious understanding of Kerr's statutory code-based trigger, Jennifer
Granick responded with amended language of her own. Her modification
would distinguish between different ways of circumventing technological
access barriers, pairing Kerr's language with a proviso that the barrier must
"effectively control access to a computer, file, or data."218 In a similar spirit,
Christine Galbraith has proposed amendments to provide immunity for
anyone accessing a website merely to obtain "information on public display,"
which she defines as "information available to the public without a fee,
including information on publicly accessible Internet websites."2 19
The common theme connecting these proposals is that platforms should
be able to do some things through code that they can't do through law. They
should generally be free to create technical measures that slow down access
to information that's already accessible to the general public, but they
shouldn't be able to use the law to punish people once they access it, nor
should the government be able to bring criminal charges based on the same
should have no effect on publicly accessible websites, including websites requiring people to apply
and even pay for an account, so long as accounts are available to anyone who provides basic
identifying information or pays a fee. There may be other legal regimes that give website owners
greater control over subsequent uses of information that is placed behind paywalls, including
contract and copyright law, but those regimes are subject to their own limitations-including
limitations designed to harmonize them with the First Amendment. See Galbraith, supra note 201,
at 324 (warning that "the CFAA unconstitutionally overrides the delicate balance of rights between
authors and the public" when courts interpret the law to "allow[] website owners to protect
information that is not protectable under copyright law"); cf Goldman, supra note 201 (proposing
that Congress should amend the CFAA to "[s]pecify that any textual attempts to restrict server usage
fail unless the terms are presented in a properly formed contract" like a "mandatory click-through
agreement").
217. See Orin Kerr, Proposed Amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1030, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 20,
2013, 1:10 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/01/20/proposed-amendments-to-18-u-s-c-1030 [https://
perma.cc/64PB-ZMDN].
218. Jennifer Granick, Thoughts on Orin Kerr's CFAA Reform Proposals: A Great Second Step,
STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc'Y (Jan. 23, 2013, 9:43 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/
2013/01/thoughts-orin-kerrs-cfaa-reform-proposals-great-second-step [https://perma.cc/E56R-
EL8E].
219. Galbraith, supra note 201, at 367. But see supra note 216 (arguing that the payment of a
fee shouldn't be legally relevant to cyber-trespass liability). Andrea Matwyshyn and Stephanie Pell
have suggested replacing the CFAA entirely with a statute grounded explicitly in the idea of
computer intrusion: "The Computer Intrusion and Abuse Act." See generally Matwyshyn & Pell,
supra note 54, at 508-73. Because Matwyshyn & Pell's proposal explicitly disavows the trespass
framework with which this Essay engages, I don't give it the attention it otherwise deserves as a
smart and provocative reform proposal.
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conduct. Since proposing his statutory amendments, Kerr has argued that
websites must feature "virtual barriers"-and not merely "virtual speed
bumps"-in order to activate CFAA liability, presumably in part to clarify
his view that the technical measure must effectively restrict the general
public's access to the information.22 0
The distinction between legal and technical barriers might seem
pedantic, but excludability often splits along these lines. Lawrence Solum
distinguishes excludability through self-help and excludability through
law.22 ' He observes that I can use self-help to exclude you from my land by
building a fence.222 But, he notes, self-help won't work "if I want to exclude
you from copying a novel that I've written and I want to make the novel
generally available for sale," partly because "[i]t would be ridiculously
expensive to hire a guard to monitor each copy or every photocopy
machine."2 3 The government, however, could "make unauthorized copying
a criminal offense or actionable civil wrong, thereby creating exclusion
through law." 224 As Solum's fence example shows, sometimes self-help
exclusion and legal exclusion are complementary, as the erection of that
physical barrier around your land can support a claim of tortious or criminal
trespass.225 But excludability needn't be reciprocal in this way. It's a political
choice whether to supplement self-help exclusion with legal exclusion.
In the context of publicly accessible websites, we've seen why it's risky
to trust platforms with legal gatekeeping powers. Now is the time to rescind
those rights. I favor Granick's and Galbraith's proposals because they give
greater clarity that the CFAA wouldn't apply on websites that are accessible
to the general public, including password-protected websites that are
effectively open to all. Both amendments would taper platforms' gatekeeper
rights, removing their ability to enforce their policy preferences on websites
that they make accessible to the general public. Congress should use these
proposals as models for an amended cyber-trespass law.
Would these amendments cause platforms to conceal their websites
behind technical barriers, making more information inaccessible to the
general public? For many reasons, I doubt it. For starters, it would probably
reduce the platforms' user bases, thereby hurting their data-driven profits. In
220. See Kerr, Norms, supra note 39, at 1161, 1147 (arguing that "limited efforts to regulate
access such as terms of use, hidden addresses, cookies, and IP blocks" should not "overcome the
basic open nature of the Web").






225. See, e.g., V.B. v. State, 959 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that no
trespass had occurred because the land in question wasn't adequately enclosed by fencing).
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some cases, inaccessibility would also be antithetical to a platform's very
function, purpose, or ethos. And in other cases, it would annoy users and open
up space for competition. But even if some platforms decided to erect greater
barriers, would it be the worst thing for users to have more choices between
the types of online services they can use? I think not, and indeed the second
step to this legislative agenda furthers that very goal.
B. Stimulating Adversarial Interoperability
Amending the CFAA is a necessary but insufficient step to cure the
present defects in cyber-trespass jurisprudence. Under prevailing law, each
platform still enjoys the power to stop its users from using a complementary
service that harnesses their existing social networks. To undo these decisions,
Congress should pass legislation to mandate and shield forms of adversarial
interoperability between platforms.
Platforms have relied on the CFAA to frustrate services offering new
forms of social interactions that appeal to their users. Due to the network
effects underlying many platforms' success, people are loath to experiment
with new players unless enough of their friends or colleagues do too.
Interoperability is one way to counteract these high switching costs, and
protecting adversarial interoperability ensures that the existing platforms
don't retain a veto power over innovation that threatens their market
dominance.
Returning to Zuckerman's Gobo experiment helps to illuminate the
stakes. As things stand, anyone seeking to create a platform that interacts
with Facebook content faces a Sophie's Choice fit for the digital age. They
must either ask Facebook's permission, knowing that it may be denied or
withdrawn for any reason at the drop of a hat; or they must plow ahead,
risking major legal exposure and relying on public opinion as protection. As
Zuckerman concedes, if his team tries to show a user's Facebook feed on
Gobo's platform, "we expect Facebook to sue us."226 Zuckerman is bullish
about this prospect:
They sue other people who try to do social network aggregators. But
we're looking forward to that.. .. I need Facebook to sue the Gobo
team, that's the point. I need to create a tool that works across different
social network[s] and when Facebook blocks us, we can say look,
these other networks allow us to do this, why is Facebook the only
network that isn't permitting this? Why is Facebook not committed to
this open-source academic project?227





Zuckerman's bravado must be read contextually. He probably knew that
his then-employer-the mighty Massachusetts Institute of Technology-had
savvy lawyers and deep pockets, as well as a cache of rhetorical power to go
toe-to-toe with Facebook in the court of public opinion before the platform
would go to a court of law. But other entities, particularly fledgling start-ups
in fiber-competitive Silicon Valley, won't be willing to risk similar
provocations. They'll have to seek Facebook's blessing and fold if it's
denied.
The law can change these dynamics. Scholars have long advocated for
legal tools to stimulate greater interconnection between networked
technologies.2" At the turn of the century, James Speta presciently proposed
a "general interconnection obligation for Internet carriers," including a
requirement of "interoperability at the core of instant messaging
technology."229 Calls have grown stronger in recent years as a cadre of
platforms has tightened its grip on the market for online communications.3 0
Przemek Palka, for example, has boldly imagined a "world of fifty
facebooks," in which "numerous companies would offer interoperable
services" of the kind currently offered by Facebook.231 Palka urges legislators
to pass laws requiring any platform like Facebook "to give potential
competitors access to its platform and network," thereby freeing other
platforms "to offer similar and complementary services" and promoting
competition on "price, quality, and innovation. "232
In a similar vein, Mike Masnick has pitched a return to an internet of
"protocols, not platforms."233 While the early internet featured many different
protocols-"instructions and standards that anyone could then use to build a
compatible interface"-we now have an internet dominated by "controlled
platforms that are privately owned."2 4 In true gatekeeper style, these
platforms "have built up walls around them, locking users in." 2 5 Masnick's
228. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 604 (1998) (endorsing interoperability as a possible solution to
problems posed by network effects).
229. James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM.
L.J 225, 228-29 (2002).
230. See Barrie Sander, Freedom of Expression in the Age of Online Platforms: The Promise
and Pitfalls of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Content Moderation, 43 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 939, 986-87 (2020) (discussing various contemporary proposals).
231. Przemyslaw Palka, The World of Fifty (Interoperable) Facebooks, 51 SEToN HALL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3539792.
232. Id. (manuscript at 4).
233. Mike Masnick, Protocols Not Platforms: A Technological Approach to Free Speech,







protocols-based internet "would push the power and decision making out to
the ends of the network, rather than keeping it centralized among a small
group of very powerful companies," giving people choice among different
interfaces and rules to suit their preferences.236 His vision involves a technical
change, not a legal one, but the spirit of his proposal could be stimulated by
legislation.
Jonathan Zittrain, meanwhile, has raised the idea of "feed recipes,"
which would give people greater control over what they see on social
media.2 7 Those disinclined to manage their own diets could rely on feed
recipes made by people or organizations that they trust.238 Much like
Zuckerman's Gobo platform, Zittrain's feature would create "slices" of
platforms' services to "introduce littleness within the bigness," instead of
breaking up or replacing large platforms entirely.239 Rather than having
platforms exclusively set the menu, people could sample complementary
services that are more to their taste.
Finally, Michal Gal and Daniel Rubinfeld's work on "data
standardization" has explored the technical hurdles that legislated
interoperability would have to overcome.2 1 They've shown how
standardizing certain types of data is an essential step to enable the "cross-
firm and cross-industry data exchanges" necessary for data portability and
interoperability between platforms.211 They acknowledge that
standardization can raise privacy concerns-"[t]he easier it is to share data,
the greater the concern that private data will fall into more hands"24 2 -but
they offer compelling proposals for how government could facilitate privacy-
protective data standardization through legislation.243 Their work is essential
reading for lawmakers considering mandatory interoperability.
New legislation is already gesturing in the right direction. The bipartisan
"Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service
Switching" (ACCESS) Act would force platforms with 100 million monthly
users to let people download their data or transfer it to another service.244 To
236. Id.
237. Columbia Journalism School, Peter Zenger Lecture with Jonathan Zittrain, YoUTuBE




240. See Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Data Standardization, 94 N.Y.U. L. REv. 737,
747-49 (2019) (identifying three primary obstacles to data portability and interoperability).
241. Id. at 740.
242. Id. at 756.
243. Id. at 764-69.
244. Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act of 2019,
S. 2658, 116th Cong. §§ 2(7)(b), 3(a) (2019); see also Adi Robertson, How Would Opening Up
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carry out this mandate, the platforms must maintain interfaces to enable
secure data transfers and provide data in a "commonly used," "machine-
readable format."245 Although Europe's General Data Protection Regulation
already requires some degree of data portability, the ACCESS Act goes
further by forcing platforms to create new interfaces that their competitors
can access.24 6 In short, the bill "ensures that users will not be stuck in the
walled garden of particular private platforms."247
But mandating interoperability through these technical interfaces is just
the tip of the iceberg. The ACCESS Act would also allow people to enlist a
third-party data custodian to serve as an intermediary to manage their
relationships with multiple platforms.248 These custodians would have to
register with the FTC and meet ethics and security standards.249 Under the
Act, platforms may block a custodian's access only if it "repeatedly facilitates
fraudulent or malicious activity." 25 1 Platforms may also charge "reasonable"
fees if another service exceeds a "reasonable threshold" of access through
their interfaces.251 But crucially, platforms can't shut out their adversaries
willy-nilly, as they've done in the past.2 s2
The beauty of this approach is that it meshes with the dominant
platforms' existing plans to become internally interoperable, giving those
platforms less rhetorical sway when they complain-as they surely will-
that the law goes too far. In a recent blogpost, Mark Zuckerberg teed up plans
to connect WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram messaging by saying that
people "should be able to use any of our apps to reach their friends, and they
Facebook Change the Internet?, VERGE (Oct. 23, 2019, 9:02 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/10/23/20926792/facebook-access-act-interoperability-data-portability-warner-hawley-bill-
explainer [https://perma.cc/23E8-DRPT] (explaining that the ACCESS Act would cover Facebook,
Twitter, Pinterest, and other sizeable platforms).
245. S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 3(a) (2019).
246. Id. § 4(a); see also Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 240, at 750 (noting how these interfaces,
known as Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), rely on data standardization); Chinmayi
Sharma, Concentrated Digital Markets, Restrictive APIs, and the Fight for Internet Interoperability,
50 U. MEMPHIS L. REv. 441, 450-61 (2019) (exploring the benefits APIs can have on competition
in digital markets). But see Daphne Keller, Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power
over Online Speech, LAWFARE (Jan. 29, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-do-
you-sue-state-and-platform-hybrid-power-over-online-speech [https://perma.cc/M83T-F4XB]
(presenting a skeptical view of what she calls the "magic APIs" model).
247. John Bergmayer, The ACCESS Act Would Give Internet Users More Options, PUB.
KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/the-access-act-would-give-
internet-users-more-options [https://perma.cc/JWC8-96RT].
248. S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019).
249. Id. § 5(c), (f).
250. Id. § 5(e).
251. Id. § 4(c)(2)(B)(i).
252. See Robertson, supra note 244 (discussing how platforms have "weaponize[d] API access
to cut off competitors" as when Facebook "did serious damage" to new social network Vine by
revoking access to Facebook's friend-finding system).
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should be able to communicate across networks easily and securely."253
Zuckerberg loves interoperability, but only when it keeps people within the
Facebook empire. The ACCESS Act would lessen his ability to enforce his
preferences.
The ACCESS Act is a promising start. But without additional
safeguards, it won't adequately shield adversarial interoperability, especially
if platforms can still wield laws like the CFAA and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act to discourage innovation that imperils their business
interests.25 4 Interoperability legislation should clearly supplant other legal
regimes that might scupper adversarial interoperability, including state-law
torts like trespass to chattels that some courts have flagged as a plausible
alternative to a narrowed CFAA.255 The ACCESS Act's directives also rest
on the existing repository of online information, but Copgress should
consider requiring platforms to make additional digital disclosures that would
benefit consumers.2 6 Lastly, the Act should ensure that services offered by
the nascent data-custodian industry are affordable. A privacy law recently
proposed by Senator Ron Wyden allows lower-income Americans to apply
for funds from the Federal Communications Commission to subsidize certain
"privacy-friendly services."25 The ACCESS Act should include similar
253. Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social Networking, FACEBOOK (Mar. 6,
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provisions. As Wyden said in announcing his bill, it's essential that "privacy
does not become a luxury good."251
Even if Congress fails to facilitate interoperability through legislation,
antitrust enforcement could command it for certain platforms instead of
breaking them up.2s9 There appears to be some appetite for this move on
Capitol Hill. Representative David Cicilline, chair of the House Judiciary
Committee's Antitrust Subcommittee, has complained that platforms-and
not people-currently have the "final say" over whether "key information"
can be used by competing or complementary services.260 Cicilline has
championed pro-competitive policies to open up the incumbent "walled
gardens" that have deterred competitors from entering the market and
benefiting consumers.261 Similar initiatives have support across the pond as
well, with European regulators and academics already advocating analogous
proposals as part of the antitrust toolkit.262 The United States should follow
suit.
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C. Regulating Data Gathering
If Congress facilitates data collection a d interoperability in the ways I
propose, it will become essential for legislators to pass a comprehensive data-
privacy law as well.263 The United States still lacks legislation to regulate
privacy in many aspects of our daily lives. Now that both California and the
European Union have passed sweeping data-privacy laws, Congress faces
significant pressure to act if it wants any say regarding the nature of digital
privacy.26
As Congress addresses data-privacy protections, a few points are
important. First, lawmakers must pay close attention to the particular harms
caused by data collection and aggregation.26 Careless assumptions that all
uses of data are harmful allow platforms to hum the tune of privacy when
there is little privacy interest at stake. Second, Congress should aim for a
"holistic architectural solution" to problems posed by data collection instead
of the "piecemeal" solution offered by laws like the CFAA.266 And third, any
legislation must be careful not to impose onerous compliance burdens that
only the giant platforms can realistically meet, for doing so will only cement
their dominance and squelch any chance of competition.267
Margrethe Vestager, the European Competition Commissioner, recommended that the Commission
consider forcing the tech giants to share data rather than breaking up the companies).
263. See Elettra Bietti, Competition, Data and Interoperability in Digital Markets, PRIVACY
INT'L (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.privacyinternational.org/explainer/4130/explainer-
competition-data-and-interoperability-digital-markets [https://perma.cc/8757-LYUP] (arguing that
"[i]nteroperability measures, even in their most effective and radical forms, must be combined with
other regulation including data protection").
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of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REv. 1687, 1690-92 (2020) (explaining the pressure on the United
States to pass data-privacy regulations following laws in California and Europe).
265. See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 115 (2014) (arguing that
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Most crucially, legislation should ensure that the law applies to the
platforms' own treatment of their users' data. Laws like the CFAA effectively
exempt platforms from responsibility for privacy harms that occur in their
own backyards. Between the CFAA's consent-based trigger and the flawed
"notice and choice" framework of privacy protection that has reigned in the
United States,268 platforms are essentially inoculated against legal liability
when they implement harmful data practices. But as we've seen, platforms
can engage in suspect practices when they harvest their own users' data. To
name but one example, it has emerged that Facebook gathered information
from around 1.5 million users' email contact books after asking for their
email passwords to "verify" their Facebook accounts.269 The platform then
used the information to improve its ad-targeting algorithms.270 So far,
Facebook appears to have faced no legal consequences for this serious breach
of trust.271
A pressing situation provides insights into the data-privacy reforms that
Congress should pursue: the rise of facial-recognition technologies. When
once-obscure company Clearview Al suddenly found itself on the front page
of the New York Times thanks to Kashmir Hill's investigative reporting, the
legal implications of scraping were thrust into public discourse.272 Clearview
Al had spent the last few years collecting over 3 billion photos from platforms
like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to develop facial-recognition
algorithms, selling its services to hundreds of companies and police
departments around the country.27 3
lofgren-introduce-online-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/XB65-MD8E]. High praise from a
preeminent critic of the status quo.
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Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Trusting Big Data Research, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 579, 586-88
(2017); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV.
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Armed with Clearview AI's technology, police can, for example, upload
a photo of a person captured by a surveillance camera and discover their name
and other information, including their accounts on social media.274 Beyond
this use by law enforcement, the technology enables a frightening level of
invasive surveillance.27s The concern with facial-recognition technology
doesn't boil down to a simple question of effectiveness. As Philip Agre
warned years ago, facial recognition "will work well enough to be dangerous,
and poorly enough to be dangerous as well." 276 When it works well, it robs
us of our privacy interests in obscurity in public.277 And when it works
poorly, it subjects people to suspicion based on actions they never took.
Clearview AI's technology provides an illustrative example that
Congress should consider when crafting data-privacy laws. The company's
practices reveal that privacy harms can flow even when data is obtained from
publicly accessible websites. Scholars like danah boyd have long made this
point:
Collecting data about people isn't in and of itself a violation of
privacy, but piecing it all together and using it to stare is a serious
violation of privacy norms. Which is why people scream privacy foul.
It's the difference between recognizing that there are others in the
locker room and staring at them as they get dressed.278
If Congress (or the courts) remove cyber-trespass liability for scraping
publicly accessible websites, Clearview Al serves as a cautionary tale.
Congress should plug the regulatory hole with targeted laws identifying and
regulating specific harms that flow from the collection and use of data,
including data that's openly available on the internet.
Lastly, in mulling over potential privacy laws, legislators should pay
attention to technological changes that might soon affect how we
communicate online. As part of an effort to stave off regulation, prominent
platforms are fiddling with their architectures and refocusing their services
274. Id. at 586.
275. For superb work on the harms enabled by facial-recognition technology, see Evan Selinger
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N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/opinion/data-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/JMB6-8W7C] (discussing the importance of obscurity and noting that "[t]hreats
to our obscurity are growing" due to advances in technology).




in ways that purportedly serve privacy interests. Facebook, for instance, is
reorienting its services-including its popular messaging and photo-sharing
applications, WhatsApp and Instagram-to prioritize encrypted and secluded
communicative forums.279 In launching a new "privacy-focused vision" for
his company, Mark Zuckerberg claimed that Facebook and Instagram had
historically "helped people connect with friends, communities, and interests
in the digital equivalent of a town square," but that "people increasingly also
want to connect privately in the digital equivalent of the living room. "280 He
expressed his belief that "we should be working towards a world where
people can speak privately and live freely knowing that their information will
only be seen by who they want to see it." 281 Zuckerberg predicts that, over
the next five years, "we're going to see all of social networking reconstituted
around this base of private communication"-and his "predictions" have the
ability to reshape online discourse in fundamental ways.282
These shifts in the social-media ecosystem should dovetail with changes
in the regulatory frameworks that shape that ecosystem. As platforms
increasingly differentiate between public and private cyberspaces, so too
should the law. The two moves can be mutually reinforcing: the distinctions
that platforms create between public and private forums can guide actors
within the legal system who draft and implement legislation, and laws can
encourage platforms to adopt robust technological barriers by hinging legal
protections on the ability to effectively seclude private cyberspaces. Under
current CFAA doctrine, platforms can claim to be serving privacy interests
by merely forbidding certain activities through their terms of service or
sending cease-and-desist letters. This is inadequate. The law can and must
create better incentives for platforms to build privacy-protective architecture.
Conclusion
We don't let foxes guard henhouses because we can't trust them to do
the job well. Likewise, we should stop giving platforms so much legal power
to police their websites.
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The CFAA is part of a broader trend that pervades internet regulation:
legislatures and courts have delegated rulemaking and enforcement authority
to platforms by dint of intent or inertia.283 Private delegation isn't always bad,
but regulators should rely on it only when it's likely that platforms will use
that leeway responsibly.284 Platforms, however, have failed to use their
gatekeeper rights in ways worthy of our trust. How could we expect
otherwise? The incentives are fundamentally misaligned.
The CFAA's scope is closely tied to the type of internet we have now
and the type we'll get in the future.285 If companies continue to use the law
to act as gatekeepers, "it will threaten open access to information for
everyone."2 6 It doesn't need to be this way. Although legislative paralysis
appears endemic in our politics, there's reason to be optimistic that Congress
might actually step up in this arena.287 We're in the midst of what Woodrow
Hartzog and Neil Richards have called a "constitutional moment" for online
privacy, "on the cusp of a set of legal changes that will structure our emergent
digital society for decades to come."288 This constitutional moment extends
beyond privacy to cybersecurity, competition, and transparency. Lawmakers
must seize this moment to pass laws fit for our times-laws that will "fix the
internet, not the tech companies."289 Let's stop trusting platforms to act in our
best interests as digital gatekeepers. Let's stop letting these foxes guard
henhouses.
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